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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
While teaching adolescents at the secondary school level, I became 
intrigued at how adolescents attempted to develop consistent patterns 
of moral behavior. A discernible quality in the adolescent's moral 
response was its variability; that is, the adolescent often varied his 
or her behavior according to a personal moral code, a set of behaviors 
appropriate for peer relationships, or a moral stance which was con-
sistent with the adolescent's social or political philosophy. 
Moreover, current thrusts in contemporary educational theorizing 
(e.g., Grant, 1981; Kagan, 1981) have come to view a minimum level of 
prosocial behavior as vital both for the educational mission of the 
American school and for the character development of individual students. 
In this study, the linkage of morality and prosocial behavior is termed 
"everyday morality." In addition, this everyday morality consists of 
three levels (or what is herein labeled visions). That is, a private 
morality incorporates one's own personal values and ethical code; an 
interpersonal morality is sensitive to the needs of others; and a social 
morality is concerned with social justice and humanitarian themes. 
Until recently, a psychological perspective of morality has been 
dominated by the structural-developmental view of Lawrence Kohlberg. 
Among the numerous criticisms of Kohlberg's approach is his tendency to 
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focus on the reasoning rather than the behavior of the moral agent. 
Thus, a focus on everyday morality, how humans respond prosocially to 
everyday situations, offers an alternative to Kohlberg's structural 
approach. 
Studies dealing with prosocial behavior invariably have been 
faced with the task of explaining the origins of this prosocial response. 
Many theorists have framed this discussion in terms of a cognitive and 
affective component innate to the human organism. Characteristically, 
this human capacity has been labeled empathy. Martin Hoffman has pro-
vided the most complete description of both this empathic component 
and its relationship to human tendencies to respond prosocially. Ac-
cordingly, focusing on the linkage between empathy and prosocial re-
sponding offers a distinctive perspective for understanding the meaning 
of morality which heretofore has been dominated by Kohlberg's structural 
view. 
At the same time, discussion has arisen concerning variations in 
group differences for both empathic and prosocial responding. Two fre-
quently mentioned areas in which differences occur are sex differences 
and partisan political orientation. Accordingly, the current study 
attemptedm measure male-female differences among three factors: empathy, 
morality, and political orientation. In addition, this study explored 
the relationships existing among the factors with an eye towards develop-
ing a theory of morality based on empathic responding. 
Empathic responding was examined by utilizing a four-dimensional 
view of empathy. These dimensions are: fantasy, perspective-taking, 
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concern, and distress. Morality is explored by using a three-vision 
level of morality which incorporates private, interpersonal, and social 
concerns. Political orientation is assessed along a liberal-conserva-
tive continuum. Consequently, this study utilized three instruments. 
Empathy was measured by Davis' Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). 
Morality is examined by means of the Visions of Morality Scale develop-
ed by the author. Finally, political orientation was explored through 
an instrument developed by researchers at the University of California, 
Berkeley. 
The findings of this study will aid educators and other profes-
sionals interested in youth concerns in addressing the moral development 
of adolescents. In addition, these findings will aid educators who 
probe the impact of political orientation on how adolescents respond 
morally. With the advent of social justice themes in many educational 
institutions, it is not unlikely that many educators will increasingly 
turn to approaches which attempt to assess the similarities and contrasts 
of students who profess partisan political leanings, thus hoping to 
lessen the impact of potentially divisive issues. Finally, an examina-
tion of sex differences among empathy, morality, and political orienta-
tion measures provides insight into such current political events as 
the "gender gap" as well as augmenting the growing body of literature 
on sex role differences and the issue of feminine morality (Gilligan, 
1982). 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM 
In an analysis of the current state of the relationship between 
morality and social science, Norma Haan (1982) has maintained that the 
positivistic interpretation of social science as value-free is no longer 
tenable. She has noted that there does not exist a unifying consensus 
among social scientists as to what constitutes morality, even though 
morality "is central to life" (p. 1096). Highlighting the need tore-
focus and rethink morality's meaning, Haan (1982) has stated that 
"little is known in a systematic sense about everyday morality and how 
it functions and develops across time and place" (p. 1096). She has 
argued (1982, 1983) that for social science in general, and for psy-
chology in particular, a reconsideration of morality must begin with an 
adequate conceptualization of "everyday morality." 
The present study gives serious attention to Haan's urgings by 
examining the feasibility of a morality for everyday life. It is argued 
that everyday morality encompasses three distinct dimensions. First, 
it incorporates empathy as a foundational component for morality. 
Second, it delineates a three-tier level of morality--private, inter-
personal, and social--which is supported by philosophical, ethical, and 
psychological theorizing. Third, it links political thinking and pro-
social behavior in order to specify behaviors which are appropriate for 
a social morality. 
4 
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The Current State of Moral Thinking 
The most ambitious attempt at delineating a theory of morality is 
Lawrence Kohlberg's developmental-structuralist approach. Kohlberg 
(1969, 1974, 1975, 1980; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) has posited a three 
level-six stage theory of morality that is invariant, sequential, and 
cross-cultural. 
In developing his theory, Kohlberg has acknowledged a large in-
debtedness to the earlier work of Piaget. Specifically, Kohlberg, 
like Piaget, has adopted a stage sequence for his theory. An individual, 
in other words, reasons morally at a particular stage of moral develop-
ment. The stages are hierarchically integrated, that is, a person 
reasoning at a higher stage incorporates and comprehends all stages of 
reasoning below his or her stage. Individuals tend to prefer the high-
est stage in which they can reason. These moral stages have been em-
pirically validated in longitudinal studies by Kohlberg and his 
associates. 
Kohlberg has maintained that reasoning is separate from the content 
of moral judgment. In other words, the actual behavior or choice which 
an individual prefers is not the focus for Kohlberg; rather, he is in-
terested in the structure of reasoning which an individual utilizes in 
choosing a particular value or in favoring one behavior over another. 
The three levels and six stages which make up Kohlberg's theory 
are presented below: 
6 
I. Preconventional Level 
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and 
labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these 
labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic conse-
quences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or 
in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules 
and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages: 
Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical 
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regard-
less of the human meaning or value of these consequences. 
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action 
consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs 
and occasionally the needs of others. 
II. Conventional Level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's 
family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, 
regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is 
not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social 
order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, 
and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or 
group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two 
stages: 
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" 
orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others 
and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypi-
cal images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. 
Stage 4: The ,;law and order" orientation. There is orientation 
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social 
order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing re-
spect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for 
its own sake. 
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and 
principles that have validity and application apart from the 
authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and 
apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. 
This level also has two stages: 
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Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally 
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in 
terms of general individual rights and standards which have been 
critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There 
is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and 
opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for 
reaching consensus. 
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is 
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen 
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, uni-
versality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and 
ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are 
not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, 
these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and 
equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human 
beings as individual persons (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 671). 
The central, underlying principle that is the basis for each stage. 
is an individual's understanding of justice. Kohlberg (1974) has stated 
that "there is a natural sense of justice intuitively known by the 
child" (p. 5). Accordingly, an individual reasons morally about values, 
life dilemmas, and personal choices in the context of an understanding 
of justice which is appropriate for his or her stage. For example, an 
individual at stage one would define a value in terms of power and 
avoiding punishment whereas an individual at stage four would reason 
that a value is preferable because of the value's importance for socie-
tal functioning and the maintenance of the social order. Within 
Kohlberg's conceptualization, each stage represents a more developed 
application of the justice principle. 
Kohlberg (1975) has stated that although moral reasoning is only 
one factor in determining an individual's moral behavior, it "is the 
single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral be-
8 
havior" (p. 672). For this reason Kohlberg has advocated a moral rea-
soning approach to moral education for public schools. Practical ap-
plications of Kohlberg's approach (Kohlberg, 1980; Kohlberg & Wasserman, 
1980) based on student and staff responses have reported a greater 
level of fairness and sense of community among school members. 
Other research has supported the importance of Kohlberg's approach. 
Rowe and Marcia (1980) have found that moral reasoning parallels cogni-
tive development and the achievement of identity. Eisenberg-Berg and 
Mussen (1975) have cited a number of research studies which relate 
growth in Kohlberg's stages with a greater resistance to cheating as 
well as an increase in prosocial behaviors. Finally, the internalization 
of moral principles (Kohlberg's principled level) has been related to 
socially responsive behaviors and altruistic values (Rushton, 1981). 
Moreover, Kohlberg's approach reveals a gradual movement from 
self-centered or hedonistic morality (preconventional morality, stages 
one and two) to a status quo or rule-oriented morality (conventional 
morality, stages three and four). Finally, there emerges an internal-
ized set of moral principles that are concerned with recognizing every 
human's freedom and treating everyone with equal respect (postconven-
tional morality, stages five and six). An individual's development 
through Kohlberg's stages shows a movement away from self-absorbtion 
(level one) toward an awareness of the thinking and feeling of others 
(level two). Finally, at level three, attention is given to universal 
moral principles that respect the rights of all human beings. In effect, 
Kohlberg's cognitive-structuralist position envisions a widening and 
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expansive social network for the making of moral decisions (Shelton, 
1983). 
In order to assess the limits of Kohlberg's theory of morality, 
it is essential that the deontological nature of his thinking is under-
stood. Kohlberg's argument for a principled morality acknowledges his 
acceptance of a deontological ethical position. Basically, this position 
argues that morality is not based on rules (e.g., the Ten Commandments), 
but rather on principles that are universally binding on all human beings. 
Conventional morality is grounded on rules and regulations and subject 
to laws that are accepted by a particular culture. Principled morality, 
on the other hand, is universally appealing. The foundation for this 
universal appeal resides in the priority given the principle of justice. 
At every moral stage, says Kohlberg, individuals reason about the mean-
ing of justice. However, it is only at stage six that justice embraces 
the attributes of fairness, equality, and reciprocity. Only at this 
stage does justice become universally acceptable because only stage six 
morality incorporates attributes which all rational persons, regardless 
of cultural background or existential situation, could agree upon. Thus 
an individual at stage six respects the freedom of others while at the 
same time behaving in a fashion that respects the equality of every 
human being. In effect, by adopting a principled morality, Kohlberg 
clearly situates his own moral theory in the ethical tradition dominant 
since the writings of Kant; thinking that enshrines the primacy of the 
autonomous self as well as the sufficiency of rational categories of 
thought. 
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The adequacy of Kohlberg's principled morality, however, have 
met with numerous criticisms. From a psychological vantage point, 
Gilligan (1982) has criticized Kohlberg's reliance on a male dominated 
moral perspective which excludes the feminine vision characterized by 
themes of care and intimacy. A further criticism of Kohlberg is the 
charge that his theory, although claiming to be culturally-free, 
actually reflects a liberal ideological position (Hogan & Emler, 1978; 
Shweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977). Finally, additional criticism center 
on the faulty empirical basis for Kohlberg's claims; in other words, 
the data do not support Kohlberg's contention that a sixth stage of 
morality in fact exists (Wonderly & Kupfersmid, 1980). More recently, 
Kohlberg (1980), too, has questioned his own assertions of stage six's 
existence. 
Empirical research between 1968 and 1976 did not confirm 
my theoretical statements about a sixth and highest stage 
(Kohlberg, 1979). My longitudinal subjects, still adolescents 
in 1968, had come to adulthood by 1976, but none had reached 
the sixth stage. Perhaps all the sixth stage persons of the 
1960s had been wiped out, perhaps they had regressed, or may-
be it was all my imagination in the first place (p. 457). 
Other theorists have also questioned the adequacy of Kohlberg's 
claims. Hoffman (1980), while praising the insightfulness and synthetic 
nature of the Kohlbergian format, has stated that "the research, by and 
large, provides little support for the main tenets of the theory" (p. 
299). Wonderly and Kupfersmid (1980), in an exhaustive review of the 
literature, found little merit to either the philosophical adequacy or 
empirical evidence surrounding Kohlberg's claims. And Shweder's (1982) 
review of the first of an expected three volume series by Kohlberg on 
the latter's theoretical positions, has questioned the adequacy of 
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Kohlberg's claims. 
Whereas psychological critiques of Kohlberg's position have center-
ed on methodological and developmental issues, normative challenges have 
focused on the questions of prescriptive values and the necessity for 
prescribed behaviors. Religious educators have expressed serious re-
servations about Kohlberg's principled morality as a basis for moral 
decision-making (Ellrod, 1980; Philibert, 1975; Shelton, 1980, 1983; 
Vitz, 1981). Briefly stated, a summary of these criticisms includes 
four salient points. These reservations are: (a) a lack of priority 
in regards to discrete values; (b) a dimunition of the role of affect 
in moral reasoning; (c) the absence of concrete, situational realities 
which are experienced by moral agents in everyday life; (d) the failure 
to link behavior with moral reasoning. 
Although not intending to address the objections of religious 
educators, Eisenberg-Berg's (1977) introduction of prosocial dilemmas 
provided one corrective to Kohlberg's approach. Eisenberg-Berg has 
stated that Kohlberg's dilemmas, fashioned in part by, and contingent 
upon the structures of governmental laws and societal norms, fail to 
appreciate the prosocial experiences human beings are socialized to 
and encounter when they make moral choices. Consequently, her research 
focused on prosocial moral reasoning rather than rule oriented moral 
reasoning. Still, this prosocial emendation fails to resolve the 
fundamental objection raised by religious educators regarding the 
separation of personal behavior from moral reasoning. That is, Eisenberg-
Berg's use of dilemmas which, like Kohlberg's, are presented as hypo-
12 
thetical situations, are predicaments rarely experienced in everyday 
life. Furthermore, her stress on reasoning rather than behavior leaves 
unanswered normative critiques which require the linkage of moral thought 
and moral behavior. Only when these as well as other questions are 
responded to, can Haan's call for the study of "everyday morality" be 
adequately addressed. 
Empathy, Moral Thinking, and Prosocial Behavior 
As an alternative to Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach, 
Martin Hoffman (1980, 1981, 1982) has set forth a theory of empathy 
having rich implications for moral theorizing. 
Kohlberg valued empathy as a vital factor in the development of 
moral reasoning. Through the use of perspective-taking, an individual, 
says Kohlberg, realizes the inadequacy of his or her present level of 
moral reasoning and comes to understand the value of reasoning at the 
next higher stage. In other words, Kohlberg views empathy as a cog-
nitively oriented experience which acts as a catalyst to stimulate moral 
growth. Hoffman, on the other hand, views empathy as both a cognitive 
and affective experience. Furthermore, he believes empathy is the 
foundation for moral development. 
According to Hoffman, empathic development fosters a growing under-
standing of a personal self that is distinct from others. As the child 
continually develops, a cognitive sense of the plight and distress of 
others merges with an affective response to their suffering. By the 
time the child reaches adolescence, this response to the misfortune of 
others includes care and concern not only for another individual, but 
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for ~ider social groupings such as races or classes of people. Several 
points of Hoffman's theory need further explanation in order to ascer-
tain the import of his theory for moral theorizing. 
First, empathy, defined as "a vicarious emotional response to 
another person" (1980, p. 307), is construed by Hoffman as an experi-
ence which incorporates three integrated factors. These three com-
ponents are:. (a) a cognitive component which comprehends the suffering 
and plight of another person; (b) an affective element which is aroused 
by the other person's suffering and responds with inner distress and 
turmoil; and (c) a motivational component which induces action to alle-
viate another person's misfortune. This elaboration of an innate and 
universally human capacity to empathize provides the psychological sub-
stratum for a morality that is fundamentally distinct from Kohlberg's 
conceptualization. 
Second, Hoffman has stated that growth in empathy parallels cog-
nitive maturation. He has noted that "the experience of empathy depends 
on the level at which one cognizes others" (1979, p. 962). Thus cogni-
tive growth allows for an empathic response to move from a diffuse, 
generalized reaction to another's distress to a highly focused emotional 
reaction to another's plight. The interplay of cognition and affect is 
a sequential process involving four levels. Empathy first appears as 
a global response to another person's distress. Lacking person perma-
nence, the child, before the age of one, is incapable of determining 
the source of personal distress and responds in an undifferentiated, 
distressful manner. Hoffman (1981) recounts the personal experience of 
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an 11 month old child who, when viewing the distress of another child, 
responded as if she herself had experienced the distress. The second 
level of empathy is termed egocentric. At this level the child is cap-
able of comprehending another's distress, yet the child is still incap-
able of differentiating between the victim's inner state and his or her 
own personal fe~lings. At the third stage, the child's cognitive trans-
formations not only allow for distinguishing among the sources of 
distress, but enable the child to respond to the inner distress of 
another person. At the highest level, the early adolescent, sustained 
by growing self-identity and a continuous life-history, is capable of 
comprehending the distress of others even when they are absent from the 
immediate situation. "To summarize, empathy is the coalescence of vi-
cariously aroused affect and a mental representation of the other, at 
whatever level the observer is capable" (1981, p. 50). This maturing 
empathic experience, it will be argued later, has critical significance 
for the formulation of the adolescent's social morality. 
Third, the engendering of prosocial behavior as the natural re-
spouse to empathic arousal furnishes an alternative view to Kohlberg's 
position which separates moral behavior from moral reasoning. It appears 
that Hoffman himself has considered this third point to be the essential 
reason for his rejection of previous moral theoretical positions. He· 
has stated: 
The crucial question that is begged here is, What makes the 
person utilize his ego capacities for moral ends rather than 
egoistic ends? In short, what seem& to be missing in the psy-
choanalytic account, as in the cognitive-disequilibrium view, 
is a concept of a mature motive force [underlining addedlthat 
may underlie moral action (1980, p. 307). 
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Moreover 5 the linkage of prosocial behavior and empathic experi-
encing supplies the consensual basis for morality as well as the 
bridging theme between autonomous moral beliefs and the diversity of 
human behaviors. In other words 5 although individuals morally reason 
to conflictual moral views and subsequently engage in contradictory if 
not opposing behaviors 5 all individuals are endowed with an empathic 
sense (Hoffman5 1975 5 1977) and all individuals admit the importance of 
a minimal level of prosocial behavior as requisite for both personal 
and societal functioning (Rushton5 1980). 
Based on extant research 5 considerable evidence sustains Hoffman's 
assertion that empathy is a basis for prosocial behavior. Staub (1978)5 
in a comprehensive review of positive social behavior 5 has stated that 
although "it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly the mediating in-
fluence of empathy on helping" (p. 146) 5 a cumulative review of the 
research does "suggest that empathy is a likely determinant of helping" 
(p. 148). Hoffman (1981 5 1982) has summarized his own developmental 
model through a compilation of numerous prosocial studies and has con-
cluded that for both children and adults, empathy emerges as an integral 
factor in fostering of prosocial behaviors. Rushton (1980, 1981) has 
maintained that empathy is a critical ingredient in the formation of the 
"altruistic personality" and has cited numerous studies to substantiate 
this claim. Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1978) have discovered that empathy 
is positively related to helping behaviors in male adolescents. Finally 5 
Buckley 5 Siegel5 and Ness (1979) found that children who were altruistic 
scored significantly highly on empathy measures than their peers while 
Ornum, Foley, Burns, DeWolfe, & Kennedy (1981) noted that this same 
relationship held true for college students. 
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At the same time, although numerous researchers have linked em-
pathic development and prosocial tendencies, no theorist has maintained 
that empathy alone is sufficient to bring about prosocial behaviors. 
In this regard, Eisenberg (1982) has noted that by adolescence, the 
adolescent can justify his or her personal behaviors (or lack thereof) 
by a diverse array of reasons ranging from hedonistic desires to in-
ternalized moral principles and that "in real life, situations that call 
for prosocial actions vary across many dimensions" (p. 241). And 
Hoffman (1982) has stated that "although one's empathic proclivities 
may make one more receptive to certain moral values, empathy alone can-
not explain how people formulate complex moral ideologies and apply 
them in situations" (p. 310). 
Visions of Morality 
As an alternative to a morality based on moral reasoning, morality 
is herein defined as a prosocial disposition which incorporates one of 
three discrete visions--the private, the interpersonal, or the social 
spheres of human living. The argument for three discrete visions of 
morality offers a maximally useful strategy for understanding the "spe-
cifity versus generality" controversy regarding moral human behavior. 
Reanalyzing the massive Hartshorne aLd May studies in the 1920s, Rushton 
(1980, 1981) has stated the original conclusions that mo~ality was 
situationally specific and, consequently, that moral consistency in 
personal behavior was limited, were in error. Rushton has contended 
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that his reanalysis of the data demonstrates a high level of consistency 
across situations; these findings have led him to posit that there 
exists an "altruistic personality." Yet it is questionable whether even 
these individuals apply the same leve.l of consistency to social forms of 
moral thinking. It is unlikely, moreover, that individuals act uniform-
ly across all situations particularly when the individual's actions are 
occasioned by a vast array of interpersonal complexities, situational 
cues, and diverse if not contradictory informational data. 
From another perspective, philosophical and ethical writings sup-
ports the argument that individuals encounter moral concerns across 
the private, interpersonal, and social life areas. The following brief 
delineation of ethical and philosophical writing is meant to be illus-
trative, not exhaustive, of these writings. A considerable body of 
philosophical, ethical, and psychological writing has viewed the 
individual's moral self as inherently linked to the capacity to make 
private moral decisions based on personally meaningful values systems 
(e.g., Conn, 1981; Nelson, 1973). However, the integration of the self 
with personal values (the private moral self) does not point to an 
atomized existence apart from others; on the contrary, theorists main-
tain (e.g., Conn, 1981) that the growth of the private moral self re-
quires the experiences of interpersonal encounters. Albeit philosophical 
and ethical discussions on conscience are controverted, there exists 
general consensus that a privately held and internalized value system 
is an essential factor for healthy and growthful human experiencing. 
For example, Rokeach and Regan (1980) have argued that successful thera-
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peutic outcomes can be facilitated by focusing on the client's contra-
dictory behaviors which create "a state of self-dissatisfaction"; in 
other words, the client's realization of the failure to live up to a 
private moral ideal creates an ensuing dissatisfaction which in turn 
fosters changes in behaviors or values thus making "them all more in-
tegrated with the person's self-conception as a basically moral and 
competent person" (p. 580). The American Psychological Association, 
likewise, explicitly mentions "conscience" as an important ethical guide 
for the psychologist when conducting 'research (American Psychological 
Association, 1981). Finally, research on the mature personality supports 
the importance of a private moral self. Heath (1965, 1980) has stated 
that an autonomous and stable value system is integral to healthy and 
mature functioning. After reviewing several developmental and personality 
theorists, Blocher (1974) has pointed out that commitment to personal 
values is an essential component of the "effective personality." 
In summary, the thread that weaves consistently through these find-
ings is the relationship of self to value and the corresponding influence 
of personal value on behavior. From a philosophical and ethical per-
spective, this privately valued self can be labeled conscience. For 
purposes of this current study, it is labeled private morality. 
The argument for an interpersonal morality needs little introduction. 
Historically, ethical guidelines (e.g., the Ten Commandments) have 
insisted upon the intrinsic unity of ethical ideals and interpersonal 
behaviors. From another standpoint, social psychological literature, 
particularly research on prosocial behavior (Rushton, 1980, 1981; Staub, 
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1978, 1979) has highlighted the importance of prosocial behaviors for 
the proper functioning and maintenance of human societies. McClelland, 
Constantian, Regalado, and Stone (1978) have argued that there is a 
relationship between psychosocial maturity and tendencies to act pro-
socially. Conn (1981) has interpreted the developmental theories of 
Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg as exemplifying the foundational compon-
ents of human authenticity. His schema envisions these developmental 
theorists as documenting the human striving for self-transcendence 
which is realized through human care and concern for others. Finally, 
two recent critiques of academic psychology have raised the possibility 
for an interpersonal morality that is prosocial in nature. Bergin 
(1980) has challenged what he terms the clinical-humanistic bias of 
contemporary psychotherapeutic theorizing and argues that consideration 
must be given a theistic value system that embraces prosocial actions. 
More recently, Wallach and Wallach (1983) have viewed psychology in 
general and psychotherapy in particular, as dominated by an egoistic 
frame of reference; they offer as an alternative a psychological view 
of the human person which values a distinctly prosocial dimension. 
Unlike private and interpersonal morality, the viewing of a social 
morality is a more recent phenomenon. Philosophical and ethical theo-
rizing, particularly since 1970, has established the need to consider a 
social morality. In philosophical writings, two seminal works have 
appeared which argue to this position. John Rawls (1971) has developed 
a theory of justice which gives priority to the social fabric and the 
needs of the disadvantaged. From a totally different perspective, 
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Macintyre (1981) has maintained that the contemporary debate regarding 
what is moral cannot be divorced from the role of social context and 
communal goals and purposes. Interestingly, it is in the context of 
a prosocial moral position that these disparate if not antiethical 
moral theories are reconciled. Likewise, theological theorizing has 
endorsed a distinctly social character. Groome (1980) has fashioned a 
view of religious education which takes on a distinctly social character 
whereas Hauerwas (1981) has argued for a normative social ethic that is 
sensitive to the social needs of society, and situates this ethic in 
the context of symbolic and story forms of social theorizing. 
Finally, psychology is not immune from the implications of social 
morality. Current questioning of psychotherapeutic practices and social 
values reflects the need for mental health professionals to address the 
concerns of social morality. For example, Eldridge (1983) has argued 
that professionals can integrate social action strategies into their pro-
fessional practices. Butcher (1983) has reviewed the literature concern-
ing the mental health practitioner as a change agent and argues that 
change agentry is a necessary and inevitable role for the psychological 
professional in today's complex society. Perhaps the most enlightening 
statement on the role of prosocial behavior and social morality's rela-
tion to psychology comes from Bandura (1974) who has stated "if psy-
chologists are to have a significant impact on common problems of life, 
they must apply their corrective measures to detrimental societal prac-
tices rather than limit themselves to treating the casualties of these 
practices" (p. 86). A theme implied throughout the above writings is 
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the essential importance and social consequences of prosocial behaviors. 
Social Morality and the Adolescent 
Shelton (1980, 1983) has maintained that the adolescent years re-
present the optimum time for the development of a personal morality that 
is social in nature. During this age period, a socially moral sense 
arises from: (a) the complex interplay of developmental issues; (b) 
the arousal of empathic urges; (c) the comprehension of political stim-
uli; and (d) the internalization of allocentric and normative values. 
From a developmental perspective, the capacity for a socially 
moral sense resides in the adolescent's experience of formal thinking 
and the struggle for identity. Formal thinking allows the adolescent 
to comprehend complex forms of social stimuli as well as intricate 
understandings of abstractions, e.g., "justice" and "peace". Thus, 
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) have noted that "the notions of humanity, 
social justice ••• freedom of conscience, civic or intellectual courage ••• 
are ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent's affective life" 
(p. 349). Understanding these concepts necessitates a capacity for ab-
straction, deductive thinking, and reflective thought which only emerges 
during the adolescent years. Consequently, when experiencing formal 
thinking, "the adolescent goes injecting himself into adult society. He 
does so by means of projects, life plans, theoretical systems, and ideas 
of political or social reform" (Piaget, 1968, p. 67). With respect to 
the foregoing, however, attention must be given to the question of whe-
ther a social morality is universally obtainable; that is, a considerable 
body of research has noted that the experience of formal thinking is not 
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a universal phenomenon during the adolescent years (Dulit, 1972; Elkind, -
1975; Keating & Clark, 1980). This objection is answered by the de-
finitional understanding of social morality defined herein. Although 
it is highly unlikely that all adolescents will achieve a high level 
of formal thinking, the experience of empathic urges and the encounter 
with numerous prosocial situations in both home and school environments 
allows virtually all adolescents to consider the possibility of making 
socially moral choices. 
It is unlikely, however, that this awakening of the concerns of 
social morality can exist as isolated from the larger developmental 
needs of identity which are salient issues for adolescent maturation 
(Miller, 1978; Marcia, 1980). Further, the linkage of psychosocial 
development and formal operational thought most likely is mediated by 
idiosyncratic factors unique to the adolescent period (Rowe & Marcia, 
1980). 
Erikson (1963, 1968) has offered the dominant theory for under-
standing the adolescent's identity quest. This identity search, framed 
in the context of crises and commitment, has received operationalized 
success through the use of the identity status paradigm developed by 
Marcia (1966). Central to the adolescent's achievement of identity is 
the experience of an ideological crisis which necessitates the adoles-
cent's successful negotiation of newly acquired ideas and values with 
formerly sacrosanct and unquestioned childhood beliefs •. This potential-
ly traumatic experience entails a fundamental reexamination of political, 
religious, and social values. 
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Although the secondary school years represent a time when identi-
ty issues are initially considered, the extant research has focused 
almost exclusively on college age young adults (Marcia, 1980). Recent-
ly, attempts have been made to apply identity paradigms to secondary 
school adolescents (M~elman, 1979). Raphael and Xelowski (1980) have 
questioned the validity of such an approach. Characteristically, 
secondary school students are unlikely and are not expected to have ex-
perienced the developmental concerns or the environmental situations 
which are requisite for the crisis and commitment struggles which may 
preoccupy the college age adolescent. They argue that a more profitable 
approach to identity measurement during the high school years is to 
assess the adolescent's familiarity with salient issues as well as the 
openness the adolescent evinces towards new experiences. In this regard, 
a morality framed in terms of prosocial behaviors appreciates the age-
appropriate level of the secondary school student's identity search. 
The fashioning of morality in the context of everyday prosocial situa-
tions provides a universal experience that is appropriate for the high 
school adolescent's initial exploration of social issues and questions. 
Thus the adolescent's awareness of the political world, engender-
ed by cognitive maturation and developmental strivings, sets the stage 
for the initial yet tentative steps toward ideological commitment; on 
the other hand, the failure to confront ideological demands relegates 
the adolescent to a confused and ambiguous value state (Erikson, 1968). 
The presence of formal thinking prepares the adolescent to attend to 
complex political stimuli whereas the capacity to reflect on a personal 
24 
life history allows the adolescent to encounter a world that is both 
complex and changing. 
It is only with increasing maturity that the adolescent be-
comes able to form generalized concepts, to understand the 
role of history and the impact of the present on the future, 
to get some feeling for social change and the possibility 
that man and social institutions may alter and be altered, 
to weigh up the wider costs and benefits of actions and de-
cisions, and to develop principles and frameworks for judging 
particular events. (Feather~ 1980, p. 281) •. 
The acquisition of formal thinking also makes available to the 
adolescent a higher level of empathic experience. Hoffman (1979, 1980) 
has tied the adolescent's greater cognitive sophistication to the abil-
ity to imagine the distresses and hurts of wider social grouping such 
as the poor, the retarded, and the oppressed. He has stated that 
"empathic affect combined with the perceived plight of an unfortunate 
group may be the most advanced form of empathic distress" (1979, p. 963). 
Clark (1980) has echoed Hoffman's assertion. While criticizing the 
dearth of research on the topic of empathy, he has stated that "the 
highest and probably the least frequent form of empathy is that in which 
the individual is compelled to embrace all human beings" (p. 189). In 
a particularly forceful passage he goes on to state: 
It isthelevel of empathy that when real and functional can 
not be used to justify the naked use of power, tyranny, 
flagrant or subtle injustices, cruelties, sustained terrorism, 
killings, wars, and eventual extinction ••• This lack of simple 
expanded empathy is in the eyes of this observer the basis of 
social tensions, conflicts, violence, terrorism, and war 
(pp. 189-190). 
The point made by both theorists is that empathy has a specifical-
ly social focus that is inextricably tied to .questions of social injustice, 
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political decision-making, and cultural values--indeed, the same issues 
which are generated by a theory of social morality. This level of em-
pathy is dependent upon cognitive maturation and expresses itself in a 
universal sensitivity towards the culturally disadvantaged. 
Moreover, Hoffman (1980) has hypothesized that many middle class 
and affluent adolescents often undergo a sense of existential alienation 
as a result of their empathic experience. Their growing awareness of 
others in contrast to their own advantaged state creates a sense of 
guilt and a subsequent distancing or disavowal from their own cultural 
mileau. Their empathic stirrings also create a personal perplexity as 
they must successfully negotiate their earlier socialization experiences 
which prized the conventional values of a competitive and success-
oriented society with their newly experienced feelings of care and con-
cern for the socially oppressed. 
Formal thinking also is considered a necessary prerequisite for 
advanced levels of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1974, 1975; Kohlberg & 
Gilligan, 1971) has consistently held that formal thought is necessary 
but not sufficient for principled moral reasoning. Originally, Kohlberg 
and Gilligan (1971) had hypothesized that the adolescent years repre-
sented the optimum time for the adolescent's initial acceptance of 
principled moral reasoning. Subsequent analysis of his data called 
into question this assertion. Kohlberg (1980) has modified his theory 
and now maintains that the secondary school years represent a time for 
intensive civic education in the context of stage four morality. In 
this revised schema, Kohlberg gives great weight to the concept of 
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experiential learning and the adolescent's inclusion in a school based 
form of participatory democracy. However, methodological flaws are not 
the only consideration for dissatisfaction with Kohlberg's version of 
adolescent morality. The social consequences of Kohlberg's position 
has left him open to the charge of liberal bias (Hogan & Emler, 1978; 
Sullivan, 1977). It is in response to this criticism that the current 
vision of morality is appropriate. The framing of morality in terms of 
prosocial choices specifically associated with social issues represents 
an effort to disassociate social moralizing from ideological bias from 
social issues, it can be argued that the construction of a socially 
moral sense in terms of prosocial behaviors attenuates the discord that 
accompanies ideological discussions and creates, if not a rapprochment, 
at least a common ground for dialogue among both liberal and conserva-
tive political orientations. If the adolescent undergoes the encounter 
with moral questions and their social significance as a result of de-
velopmental experiences and tasks, then the young person faces concrete 
choices in an environment interspersed with political decisions and 
ideological values. 
In the secondary school years, adolescents begin to develop both 
a deepening understanding of political realities and the capacity to 
think critically about social phenomena. In the early high school years, 
these evaluation are elementary and simplistic. Through the later high 
school years and during the undergraduate years of college, however, 
adolescents are capable of developing a rudimentary ideology and phil-
osophy of life that aids them as they evaluate political and social 
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institutions. At the same time, the ideological groundings for most 
adolescents are unstructured; that is, the overwhelming number of 
adolescents display thought patterns in which complex and hierarchally 
ordered belief structures are lacking (Adelson, 1971, 1975; Gallatin, 
1980). 
The adolescent's disinclination to form an ideologically struc-
tured belief system arises from several factors. Adolescents, like 
children, form political thinking patterns which reflect adult values; 
therefore, because most adult Americans are non-ideological in their 
belief structures, it stands to reason that adolescents, too, will re-
fleet weak ideological commitments (Adelson, 1979; Conger, 1976). 
Furthermore, the adolescent's awakening to serious political issues is 
influenced by numerous socializing influences which include parents, 
teachers, peers, and the media (Jennings & Niemi, 1974). It is highly 
likely that these numerous_ influences offer at times contradictory and 
opposing interpretations of political realities which attenuate the 
adolescent's attempt at forming political commitments. Finally, the 
nature of political reality itself is often complex and variable. 
Adelson (1975) has captured the essence of political events and their 
accompaning ambiguity. He has noted: 
We have gone from a one-on-one collision of values to far 
more complicated issues; the relation of variable means to 
variable ends; the relation of uncertain means to uncertain 
ends; the relation between short- and long-term ends; the 
relation between individualistic and collective goods; the 
distinction between particularistic and universalistic 
orientations; the collison between values, and also the col-
lison between interests, and between interests and values 
(p. 76). 
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Consequently, the adolescent must attempt to make sense of a vast array 
of information and in the midst of this complexity construct a person-
ally meaningful value system. No doubt this venture is often frustrat-
ing and for some adolescents leads to adoption of an unreflected ideo-
logical position whereas for other adolescents this confusion leads to 
the abandonment of any attempt at political commitment. It is likely 
that most adolescents fall between these extremes. Unlike the privately 
encountered moral choices which adolescents face concerning questions 
of personal ethics--should I lie? Should I steal?--questions of politi-
cal morality are inherently complex and often lack moral clarity. 
Furthermore, the certitude and moral simplicity of the past, which can 
no longer suffice as a moral reference point, renders the adolescent 
vulnerable to the confusion and questionings which characterizes the 
political worlds of the adult (Shelton, 1980, 1983, 1984). 
The framing of morality in a prosocial context offers the adoles-
cent a respite from the moral confusion emanating from political con-
troversies. Although adolescents might evince uncertainty as to which 
of several political choices are moral, their familiarity and socializa-
tion to prosocial behaviors provide a resourceful means for creating 
interest in and commitment to socially important issues. 
Morality Defined 
It is the purpose of this study to answer Haan's challenge to 
psychology to rethink the meaning of morality and to conceptualize a 
morality appropriate for "everyday" life. Based on the research pre-
viously cited, three focuses are essential for constructing such a 
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morality. First, Hoffman's research on the universalizing experience 
of empathy pinpoints the need for an awareness and vicarious experience 
of another's needs. Second, the unanimity accorded the need for pro-
social behaviors for both relational and social functioning as well as 
the necessity fo~ a behavioral component highlights the need to incor-
porate prosocial behavior as an integral factor in any definition of 
morality. Third, the fact that moral agents must strive to find mean-
ing and value as they encounter a complex array of realities and 
situations necessitates a multivisioned approach to morality that is 
sensitive to the private, interpersonal, and social dimensions of 
human experience. 
Bearing the above in mind, morality is defined as the realization 
of another's need(s), that is, in the context of the individual's 
particular situation, engaging in appropriate behaviors to benefit the 
distressed person. In addition, this moral response is carried out 
within the context of one of three dimensions--the private, the inter-
personal, or the social. Specifically, private morality is defined as 
an anonymous prosocial response or a response that benefits a person(s) 
unknown to the moral agent. Interpersonal morality is defined as a pro-
social response directed towards a person known by the moral agent. 
Social morality is defined as a prosocial response directed towards a 
person(s) who are disadvantaged, powerless, or who suffe~ from social 
injustice. 
The value of this approach to morality is twofold. First, this 
understanding of morality allows for the inclusion of cognitive, 
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affective, and behavioral factors. The cognitive and affective factors 
are experienced by empathic arousal whereas the behavioral factors are 
accounted for by the presence of prosocial behaviors. Second, this 
approach to morality affords numerous research opportunities for study-
ing the cognitive, affective, behavioral and situational factors which 
influence how individuals come to experience themselves as moral persons. 
CHAPTER III 
THE HYPOTHESES 
If empathy is an essential component of morality, then serious 
attention must be given to how individuals experience empathy. Of 
particular interest is the question of whether males and females differ 
in their empathic experiences. 
Sex Differences in Empathy 
Maccoby & Jacklin (1974), in an extensive review of the literature 
on empathy have reported no significant differences exist between the 
empathic experiences of males and females. Hoffman (1977b) has labeled 
this conclusion "premature" (p. 713). Examining closely the specific 
studies reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin, Hoffman has stated that only 
six of their studies can be classified as true measures of vicarious 
affective arousal to another's experience (Hoffman's definition of em-
pathy). In all six of these studies, says Hoffman, females obtained 
greater levels of empathy than males. Hoffman has noted that combining 
other studies which recognized another's distress "masked" the true 
differences that do exist between males and females. 
Hoffman's (1977b) own review of the literature has led him to 
conclude that .differences between males and females do exist. He has 
stated "what is most striking about the empathy findings ••• is the fact 
that in every case, regardless of the age of the subjects or the measures 
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used, the females obtained higher scores than did the males" (p. 715). 
In an examination of 16 recent articles,: Hoffman has found that: in all 
16 studies females reported higher empathy scores than males. The 
chances of such a uniform confirmation on 16 independent samples, says 
Hoffman, is 1 in 64,000. He has concluded that "although the magnitude 
of the difference may not have been great, the findings overall clearly 
provide a stronger case for the proposition that females are more em-
pathic through the life cycle than that no sex differences exists" 
(p. 715). 
Feshbach's (1982) extensive analysis of empathy differences in 
children has supported Hoffman's conclusion that differences do exist. 
She adds, however, that in children numerous and complex factors ac-
count for male and female differences. 
Scales to measure empathy have also supported differences between 
males and females. Mehrabian and Epstein's (1972) scale for empathy 
measurement differentiated between males and females at a significant 
level. These findings were supported by Davis' (1980) multidimensional 
approach to empathy wherein among all four dimensions (empathic concern, 
perspective-taking, personal distress, and fantasy) females scored sig-
nificantly higher than males (~< .001). 
Further, it is noteworthy that an analysis of Davis' findings 
supports Hoffman's argument for empathic differences. Hoffman (1977b) 
has stated that although there is clear evidence for differences be-
tween male and females regarding the level of affective arousal (meas-
ured by the empathic concern subscale), no such consistency can be found 
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with more cognitively oriented measures, ~uch as perspective-taking. 
Davis (1980) has noted that his own research results showthat although 
perspective-taking is highly significant, male and female differences 
are lowest for this subscale thus lending support to Hoffman's conclu-
sion that perspective-taking is a less discriminant measure of male-
female differences. 
Besides the cognitive dimension (perspective-taking subscale) and 
affective dimension (empathic concern subscale), Davis' multi-dimension-
al approach identifies two other subscales--personal distress and 
fantasy. 
The personal-distress subscale measures extreme emotional arousal 
to another's distress. In other words, this scale appears to be a more 
extreme dimension of affective arousal to another's plight. This di-
mension is important because Hoffman (1981, 1982) has noted that a£-
fected overal-arousal can attenuate helping behavior in individuals 
who are exposed to another's distress. 
Davis' (1980) findings that females experience significantly more 
distress at another's plight is the result of several factors. First, 
the affective arousal evinced by women on the empathic concern subscale 
and supported by Hoffman's (1977b) findings might carry over to a more 
extreme response leading to affective over-arousal. Second, Hoffman has 
suggested that males are oriented to a more "instrumental" role which 
implies an active mastery of the world and social competence. Extending 
.this thinking to the present question, if females are less socialized 
to initiate behaviors to relieve the distress gf another, then it is 
. -
/ , .. ; . 
plausible that their affective arousal to another might well lead to 
personal distress. 
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Davis' fantasy subscale measures an individual's tendency to 
imaginatively take the role of another. Several items on this subscale 
were taken from an earlier scale developed by Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, 
Hansson, and Richardson (1978). Unfortunately, Stotland et al., report-
ed no findings from their data regarding sex differences for their scale. 
Staub (1978) has reported that a difficulty with fantasy research that 
relates to empathy and helping behaviors is the question of external 
validity; in other words, real life situations are often inherently 
more complex than the "imagine" condit;ions developed in experimental 
settings. 
Hoffman (1977b) has suggested that females are more apt to imagine 
themselves as another. This predisposition is the result of affective 
arousal, socialization experiences, and an inner sense of self which 
seeks interaction with others. Staub (1978) gives indirect support to 
this conclusion; he has noted that females are more inclined to attend 
to the feelings of others and place greater value on being considerate 
of others. Gilligan (1982), moreover, has argued that females place 
greater emphasis than males on the values of care and intimacy. 
In addition, the statements on Davis' subscale have a distinctly 
empathic focus which emphasize consideration and awareness of others. 
In light of the above, his findings of a high statistical significance 
(~< .001) between males and females are most likely the result of the 
sensitivity of the measure to the value females place on personal at-
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tentiveness towards others. Thus, in this study, it is hypothesized 
that females will score higher than males on all empathy scales. 
Social Morality and the .Liberal Adolescent 
Political socialization studies have noted that ideological belief 
systems reflect a variety of discrete personality characteristics, 
moral beliefs, and socialization experiences (Bluhm, 1974). 
The question of ideological beliefs and moral thinking has re-
ceived widespread attentioh, although research has generally focused on 
the college age adolescent (Flacks, 1967; Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; 
Keniston, 1968). The dominant thrust of this research appeared to show 
that radical college students typify a higher degree of moral thinking 
and behavior than do their conservative peers. Gallatin (1980), in a 
summary review of the extant research, has concluded that in fact such 
assertions were often misleading and that more recent findings have 
provided an "important corrective" to the uncritically accepted portrait 
of the student activist portrayed in previous research. 
Mussen, Sullivan, and Eisenberg-Berg (1977) have noted that the 
transition from early to late adolescence involves a shift in ideologi-
cal values. Late adolescents are significantly more likely than early 
adolescents to adopt liberal positions on political and economic issues. 
Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1980) have noted that politically oriented 
conservative and liberal adolescents evince distinctive personality 
characteristics as well as distinguishing socialization experiences. In 
general, the results supported the commonly held assumption that con-
servatives are more traditional, success-oriented, and organized whereas 
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the distinguishing traits for liberal were their independence and re-
belliousness. The two researchers also found that liberal adolescents 
scored higher on an empathy measure than their conservative counter-
parts and described themselves as having qualities highly similar to 
attributes associated with prosocial behaviors. It should be noted, 
however, that their study measured attributes of altruism rather than 
subjects' self-reports of prosocial behaviors which is the focus of the 
current study. Mussen (1982) has supported these findings, yet he 
has taken the analysis of personality factors one step further. He has 
maintained that there exists an intrinsic unity between liberal ideo-
logical values and a prosocial commitment towards others. Thus "com-
parisons between factors found to be associated with political liberal-
ism and the antecedents of prosocial behaviors reveal many similarities 
and parallels, thus providing convincing support for the notion that 
liberalism and prosocial behavior are indeed conceptually linked" (p. 
374). At the same time, he has called for further studies to explore 
the characteristics which might differentiate the prosocially oriented 
conservative from a liberal peer. A valuable feature of all the above 
studies is their focus on secondary school adolescents rather than the 
college age late adolescent. 
In addition to measures of personality characteristics and parti-
san political views, attention has also been given to the relationship 
of morality to ideological preference. Basically, this research has 
supported the conclusion that when ideological orientation is taken 
into consideration, adolescents differ on their level of moral thinking. 
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That is, liberally oriented adolescents embrace higher stages of moral 
thinking (principled morality) whereas their conservative peers are in-
clined a more conventional level of moral reasoning (Haan, Smith, & 
Block, 1968; Elmer, Renwick, & Malone, 1983; Nassi, Abramowitz, & 
Youmans, 1983). In regards to secondary school students, Eisenberg-
Berg (1979) has found that a liberal political orientation was posi-
tively related to prosocial moral reasoning for females but not for 
males. It should be noted, however, that her version of moral reason-
ing, with the inclusion of the prosocial dimension, is distinct from 
Kohlberg's rule oriented approach. 
A result of the above research has been to associate Kohlberg's 
moral stages with ideological beliefs. In other words, the findings 
of the above research have led to the conclusion that moral structure 
is related to partisan political thinking. In terms of the focus for 
this study, this means that higher stage of moral reasoning (the 
structure) relates to an adolescent's belief system (the content). 
Consequently, the liberal adolescent's political views are associated 
with his or her higher moral stage whereas conventional moral reasoning 
is associated with conservative political views. 
Recently, research has been reported which takes issue with this 
prevailing assumption. In a particularly illuminating study, Elmer 
et al., (1983) have reported evidence that challenges the relationship 
between moral structure and ideological content. These researchers 
discovered that although left-wing students scored significantly higher 
on a moral reasoning measure than their conservative or moderate peers, 
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the latter two groups were, upon instruction, able to increase sig-
nificantly their own moral reasoning scores when told to respond as a 
radical. As a consequence, there was no significant differences report-
ed between the moral reasoning levels of left-wing students and con-
servatives and moderates .when the latter two groups were asked to 
replicate the views of their left-wing peers. The structural position 
of Kohlberg, on the other hand, would have predicted that conservatives 
are unable to comprehend the principled moral reasoning level of lib-
erally inclined students. A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from 
these data is that individuals professing partison political preferences 
simply believe their own position is correct and that they do not ascribe 
a higher level of morality to those that reason differently than they 
do. 
Moreover, it does appear that some differences do exist among 
liberals and conversatives regarding the content of their thinking. 
The research which has accumulated with the Liberalism Scale used in 
this study (Mussen, 1982; Mussen et al., 1977) has shown that liberals 
favor positions that attend to the rights and needs of socially dis-
advantaged groups (social morality). Given the findings of Elmer et al., 
it is plausible that conservatives are not opposed to prosocial behav-
iors which benefit these groups. They might simply prefer a moral 
position which favors personal investment in private and interpersonal 
moral concerns. No research evidence is available, however, to ascer-
tain how.liberals and conservatives might differ in regards to everyday 
private and interpersonal prosocial behaviors. 
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Hypotheses Defined 
Due to the nature of social morality, that is, it's focus on 
questions of social injustice and social issues, it is hypothesized 
that liberal adolescents will demonstrate a significantly higher level 
of social morality than conservative adolescents. Concomitant with 
previous research on empathy, it is also hypothesized that females will 
score significantly higher on all empathy measures than males. 
An important feature of the present research is the development 
of a new measure for measuring moral development. In order to obtain 
construct validity for the Visions of Morality Scale, the measure was 
administered to two groups of students. Fifteen students who voluntar-
ily engaged in social service projects both at their school and in their 
community were matched with a control group of students who were not 
involved in socially oriented service projects. Both groups were ad-
ministered the Visions of Morality Scale. A high degree of statistical 
significance, _!(28) = -3.56, .E_< .001, was found between the two groups. 
In other words, students who engaged in prosocially oriented projects 
scored significantly higher on the morality measure than did students 
who were not active in social service activities. Thus the Visions of 
Morality Scale appears capable of successfully identifying those adoles-
cents who are inclined to act prosocially. 
The Visions of Morality Scale provides an opportunity to envision 
morality as a prosocial phenomenon and at the same time offers an ef-
ficient way to measure the level of the adolescent's prosocial response 
in a variety of everyday situations. Consequently, this measure offers 
~ 
researchers the possibility of addressing the issue of everyday moral-
ity from a prosocial perspective. A significant feature of the present 
study is the development of this scale and the .three subscales of pri-
vate, interpersonal, and social morality. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 82 male and 99 female adolescents attending an 
all male or all female Catholic college preparatory secondary school 
in the Chicago area. All students were first semester seniors; con-
sequently, the students were adolescents in the 17 to 19 years of age 
range. 
No personal data sheet was utilized in this survey; still, sever-
al general characteristics could be attributed to this subject popula-
tion. The overwhelming majority of students attending both schools 
were middle or upper middle class. In addition, over 90% of the stu-
dents at both schools were Catholic. Finally, over 80% of the students 
at both schools were Caucasian. There was no reason to believe that 
the population surveyed differed in any significant way from the overall 
student body population. · As a consequence, the "typical" student sur-
veyed could be described as: Caucasian, Catholic, and middle class. 
Measures 
Three instruments were used in this survey: The Visions of 
Morality Scale (VMS); The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI); and the 
Political Orientation Scale (POS). 
The Visions of Morality Scale, devised by the author, measured 
ltl 
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the subject's response to 45 everyday prosocial situations. The cri-
teria use~ for constructing the situations were the following: The 
author had observed the particular situation occurring among adoles-
" ,, ' ' .. 
cents he had either taught or counseled, or he had been informed about 
the situation through personal contact with an adolescent who had ex-
perienced the situation. The opportunity for this contact with adoles-
cents occurred while ~he author was an instructor and counselor at a 
Catholic college preparatory school in Denver, Colorado during the 
late seventies. These two criteria insured the construction of pro-
soc.ial . situations which are commonly experienced by adolescents in 
everyday life. 
The subjects responded to the instrument by completing a 1 to 7 
point Likert scale for each item. The Likert scale ranged from "I 
would DEFINITELY do what .the statement says I do" to "I DEFINITELY 
WOULD NOT do what the statement says I do." As a consequence, the 
possible range for a total morality score for each student was from 45 
to 315. 
In addition to the total score, the instrument allowed for the 
measurement of three subscale scores. Morality was perceived not as 
unidimensional, but rather as an individual's moral response consti-
tuted within one of three distinct visions: the private, the inter-
personal, or the social. Thus, utilizing the 7 point Likert scale 
format, the range of scores for each vision ranged from 15 ( a 1 point 
response to each prosocial situation) to 105 (a 7-point response to 
each situation). In order to account for response set, 30 of the 
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situations were scored in the positive direction and 15 (5 for each 
vision) were scored in the negative direction. 
The author was concerned especially about the subjects' respond-
ing in a socially desirable manner inasmuch as self-report inventories 
are particularly prone to deception and faked responses (Anastasi, 1976). 
As a way to counter a socially desirable response set the following 
measures were employed: First, all subjects were guaranteed anonymity. 
Second, subjects were instructed that there were no right or wrong 
answers. Third, the vast majority of the situations were everyday events 
which adolescents typically encounter; many of these responses, there-
fore, lacked the discernible character of socially desirable behaviors. 
Fourth, as a preliminary step in the formulation of the final instru-
ment, a sample of 20 young adult seminarians responded to the question-
naire. Their responses to the VMS demonstrated a wide distribution of 
responses both for the total score as well as the three subscale scores. 
These ranges were: total morality score, 149-263 (M = 202, SD = 37.0); 
private morality subscale score, 31-88 (M = 67.2, SD = 14.2); interper-
sonal morality subscore, 48~91 (M = 73.7, SD = 11.6); social morality 
subscore, 31-91 (M = 61.8, SD = 18.0). Finally, research supports the 
efficacy of paper and pencil measures in predicting prosocial behaviors 
(Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Rushton, 
1981). 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index was developed by Davis (1980) 
to examine multidimensional aspects of empathy. This scale consists of 
28 self-report statements that ask an individual to describe how he or 
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she would react to a variety of empathically eliciting items. 
Other measures of empathy (Hogan, 1969; Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972) have utilized statements that assess both the cognitive and af-
fective components of empathy thereupon combining them into a single 
score. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index is an improvement on this 
approach. A factor analytic study (Davis, 1980) revealed four distinct 
groupings of items. These four dimensions were labeled: fantasy, 
perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress. The 
.final instrument was constructed by incorporating only those items 
which loaded most heavily for both sexes on their respective factors. 
The.final instrument consisted of four-seven item subscales; these 
items were randomly ordered on the final empathy measure. This measure 
utilized a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "never" to "always." 
Consequently, a total empathy score ranged from 28 to 140 whereas sub-
scale scores ranged from 7 to 35. Nineteen items were scored in a . 
positive direction, 17 in the negative direction. 
Davis (1980) has noted that although significant intercorrelations 
do exist for males (fantasy and empathic concern, .30; fantasy and per-
sonal distress, .16; perspective-taking and empathic concern; .33; 
personal distress and empathic concern, .11; personal distress and per-
spective-taking, -.16) and for females (fantasy and perspective-taking, 
.12; fantasy and empathic concern, .31; perspective-taking and empathic 
concern, .30; perspective-taking and personal distress, -.29) all at 
the £ < .01 level, the intercorrelations among the four dimensions are 
not of sufficient magnitude to suggest that they are measuring the same 
construct. 
In the light of the foregoing, the intercorrelations among the 
three subscales--perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal 
distress--give support to Hoffman's developmental conceptualization of 
empathic development. In other words, the child's growing capacity 
to recognize distinctions between self and a distressed other and the 
ability to develop a sense of compassionate understanding towards the 
distressed individual most likely involves some linkage of empathic 
concern, perspective-taking, and personal distress. Furthermore, the 
negative association between personal distress and perspective-taking 
supports a salient assertion of Hoffman's (1980)--that empathic over-
arousal can inhibit prosocial behaviors. 
Test-retest reliability coefficients among the four subscales 
(fantasy, perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress) 
were for males: .79; .61; .72; and, .68. For females these same sub-
scales were: .81, .62; .70; and, .76.-
All in all, Davis (1981) has concluded that: 
The new measure, then, may be said to have the following 
characteristics. First, it has excellent psychometric pro-
perties. The factor structure remains constant for both sexes 
across independent samples and across repeated administrations. 
In addition, the internal reliability of the four scales is 
quite acceptable. Second, the pattern of sex differences 
found for the four scales is consistent with the general pat-
tern found in empathy research. Females score substantially 
higher than males on the measures of emotional reactivity 
(including the fantasy scale), and less strongly so on the 
scale most clearly measuring perspective-taking ability. 
Finally the relationships found to exist among these subscales 
also support previous theorizing about the development of 
empathic tendencies (pp. 14-15). 
't ~ .-· 
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The Political Orientation Scale was an instrument developed by 
Mussen et al., (1977) to assess the political orientation of high 
school age adolescents. Subsequently, the instrument has been used 
extensively for measuring ideological orientations of secondary school 
students (Eisenberg-Berg, 1977; 1979; Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1980; 
Mussen, 1982; Mussen et al., 1977). The original instrument contained 
41 agree-disagree items which assessed adolescent ideological values 
regarding partisan issues including: foreign policy issues, labor-
management relations, criminal rights, personal freedoms, welfare con-
cerns, and so forth. 
The items were based on the responses of adolescents to informal 
interviews and .the items were worded in such a way as to be easily 
comprehended by secondary school students. Factor analysis reve~led 
32 of the 41 items to be loaded on a liberalism-conservatism dimension. 
These 32 items were used to construct the political orientation question-
naire. Thus individuals scoring high on the measure are viewed as en-
dorsing a liberal political orientation whereas low scores are perceived 
as adopting a conservative orientation. Due to the high correlations 
existing between high scores on this scale and the prosocial empathy 
measures, this scale will be labeled the Liberalism Scale. Middle 
range scores are interpreted as individuals who are non-partisan in their 
political thinking. It is not possible to discriminate between indi-
viduals who are moderate in political orientation and those who are 
apolitical; however, it can be presumed that extreme scores reflect a 
more pronounced ideological commitment toward either liberalism or 
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conservatism. 
In order to insure a wide distribution of scores, the response 
scoring was altered from a dichotomous forced choice format to an 8-
point Likert scale which ranged from "I very strongly agree with this 
statement" to "I very strongly disagree with this statement." Thus 
the range of possible scores was from 32 to 256, or from an extreme 
conservative response to an extreme liberal response. Sixteen of the 
statements were scored in the positive direction and 16 were scored in 
the negative direction. 
In addition, this new scoring format more realistically reflected 
the function of ideological and partisan value positions. In other 
words, the complexity of socio-political issues do not lend themselves 
to simple agree-disagree responses, but rather are responses to a broad 
spectrum of commitments ranging from minimal interest to passionate in-
volvement. Moreover, extreme ideological commitments represent not only 
political interest, but most likely complex reactions which include 
cognitive and affective components. Utilizing a larger range of re-
sponses allows for a more precise measurement of the intensity of the 
partisan response. 
Procedure 
All three instruments were administered on 2 separate days (1 
week apart) to students at each school. Most students were able to 
complete the 105 question instrument in the allotted time of one class 
period (either 45 or 50 minutes). The investigator was present at all 
administrations to insure uniform procedures were adhered to. 
Seventeen students were unable to complete the instrument in the al-
lotted time or their protocols were unusable. All subjects remained 
anonymous. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 summarizes the ranges, means, and standard deviations 
for the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS), the Liberalism Scale (LS), 
and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). 
A Summary of Sex Differences 
Table 2 summarizes male-female differences on all three measures. 
It is evident from the data that there exist large differences between 
males and females in terms of empathy, liberalism, and morality scores. 
The consistency of the findings over all measures supports the conclu-
sion that in terms of experience of empathy, the political self, and 
the moral self there do exist differences between males and females. 
Sex Differences in Empathy 
It was hypothesized that females would score higher than males 
on all empathy measures; these hypotheses were for the most part con-
firmed. Females scored significantly higher than males on four of 
give empathy variables. All differences, except for the fantasy sub-
scale score, were at a statistically significant level; the fantasy 
subscale score approached statistical significance. 
The higher females score on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
showed the following levels of significance: fantasy (E< .058); per-
spective-taking (E< .01); concern (E< .01); distress (E< .001); total 
(E< .001). 
49 
.. 
Table 1 
Range, Mean, and Standatd.Deviation for Ten Measures 
Morality 
(Private) 
Morality 
(Interpersonal) 
Morality 
(Social) 
Morality 
(Total) 
Liberalism 
Empathy 
(Fantasy) 
Empathy 
(Perspective 
Taking) 
Empathy 
(Concern) 
Empathy 
(Distress) 
Empathy 
(Total) 
Range Mean 
27-85 55.09 
30-82 59.67 
11-79 43.48 
91-240 158.43 
73-190 129.98 
4-26 14.58 
5-25 15.68 
10-25 17.61 
1-24 12.44 
37-86 60.28 
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Standatd"Deviation 
11.06 
10.36 
13.06 
29.06 
19.85 
4.10 
4.14 
~ 
3.03 
4.18 
9.84 
Table 2 
Sex Differences on Measures 
Measure 
Morality (Private) 
Morality (Interpersonal) 
Morality (Social) 
Morality (Total) 
Liberalism 
Empathy (Fantasy) 
Empathy (Perspective) 
Empathy (Concern) 
Empathy (Distress) 
Empathy (Total) 
p< .01 
p<.OOl 
5~ 
of Morality. Liberalism, and Empathy 
Sex M SD t 
F 58.12 9.97 4.16 ** 
M 51.46 11.27 
F 62.67 10.06 ** 4.52 
M 56.02 9.56 
** F 47.75 12.27 5.17 
M 38.32 12.16 
** F 168.91 26.02 5.69 
M 145.88 27.62 
** F 135.95 19.00 4.79 
M 122.36 18.32 
F 15.10 4.28 1.91 
M 13.95 3.81 
F 16.41 3.90 * 2.61 
M 14.80 4.27 
* F 18.23 2.80 3.06 
M 16.87 3.14 
F 13.65 4.08 ** 4.53 
M 10.98 3.84 
F 63.37 9.83 4.98 ** 
M 56.54 8.50 
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The findings support Hoffman's review of the literature regard-
ing sex differences for empathy. The smaller differences between males 
and females for perspective-taking demonstrates that recognition of 
another's need is less a discriminating factor for males and females 
regarding empathy than is reaction to the plight of another (measured 
by distress which is highly significant). The higher female distress 
score might well be a consequence of affective arousal and learned 
socialization responses which downplay female competence in stressful 
situations. 
A more difficult interpretation concerns the marginal difference 
between male and female fantasy subscale scores. Davis (1980) report-
ed differences between females and males to be significant at the .001 
level. The current findings suggest a much smaller difference exists. 
Two factors might account for this disparity. First, Davis' population 
was a much larger sample. As a consequence, a lesser value was needed 
to obtain a higher level of significance. Second, the current sample 
was drawn from a secondary Catholic school. Greeley (1981) has stated 
that good instruction techniques and amicable teacher-student relation-
ships tend to foster warm imagery among Catholic adolescents who at-
tend Catholic secondary school. Since the Catholic boy's school 
sampled in the present study is noted to have large financial resources 
and an excellent faculty, it might well be that these factors have in-
fluenced the imaginations of the students and contributed towards a 
.. high level of fantasy for males. 
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Sex Differences in Libe~alism 
The large male-female differences regarding partisan political 
orientation reflects the larger national political climate wherein 
there exists a "gender gap"; that is, according to.national survey 
sampling (e.g., Gallup Poll), females are inclined to support liberal 
candidates. Although research does report a gradual liberalization 
among adolescents occurring with age (Mussen et al., 1977), there-
search does not report.whether significance differences exist between 
males and females. On the other hand, an examination of the Liberalism 
Scale lends support to the greater preference by females to endorse 
liberal political positions. Many of the issues and choices on the 
scale are indicative of prosocial tendencies which reflect caring be-
haviors and the desire to .alleviate conflicts by peaceful means. In 
comparison with the conservative position on the scale, these themes 
are decidely weighed on the side of liberalism. Given the female pro-
clivity to endorse prosocial positions (discussed in the next section), 
it is reasonable to conclude that females are more inclined to endorse 
liberal attitudes. 
Sex Differences in Morality 
Highly significant differences on the Visions of Morality Scale 
were consistently found between males and females. For the VMS these 
differences were: private~< .001); interpersonal (~< .001); social 
(~< .001); and total (~< .001). 
Because morality is herein defined as prosocial behavior--actions 
which benefit others--a plausible interpretation of the morality 
differences is that females, as opposed to males, are more apt to 
favor behaviors which aid others. 
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The present findings lend support to other studies as well as 
more theoretical speculations which maintain that females act more pro-
socially than males. Behaviors which benefit others have generally 
been defined in the literature as generosity (giving material aid to 
another person), being helpful (aiding another when he or she needs 
help), and bystander rescue (intervening when another individual is 
in an emergency .situation) (Staub, 1978). Underwood and Moore (1982) 
have noted that the results of these studies are mixed. In terms of 
generosity and helpfulness, the consistent finding is that females 
demonstrate more positive behavior than males. The researchers state 
that there does exist a sex difference, albeit small, in the prosocial 
responses of males and females; yet, this prosocial tendency does not 
always occur. For example, there does exist evidence to suggest that 
in some emergency situations, males are more likely to intervene and 
aid the distressed person than are females. Staub (1978) has suggest-
ed that perhaps the male-female differences exist because males are 
more concerned with equity and keeping their personal freedom; these 
tendencies, consequently, might lead them to be less helpful than fe-
males. Thus an individual in need might elicit a negative reaction 
from the male who values independence and is dependent upon a high 
level of status. He notes, however, that interpretations of male-
female differences regarding prosocial acts are complex due to the 
limitations of the experimental studies and the numerous and at times 
55 
contradictory interpretations which can be given the research findings. 
In addition, Staub (1978) has questioned Maccoby and Jacklin's 
(1974) conclusion that .there exist no differences in the helping be-
haviors of males and females. This lack of .differences, says Staub, 
might be due to the types of studies, they examined. For example, in 
their discussion of rescue studies, the researchers failed to note 
male tendencies towards competence which might have led them to inter-
vene as much as females. Staub has noted that 
under certain circumstances females may be more helpful 
.than males, because they are competent in a particular areas, 
because being helpful is more socially appropriate for them, 
or because certain characteristics they acquired (or tend 
to possess by heredity) make them more likely to be helpful 
(p. 254). 
From another perspective, the values prized by females might sup-
port a greater tendency for females to act prosocially. Rokeach (1973; 
Rokeach & Regan, 1980) has suggested that values represent ideal end 
states which serve as evaluative standards for personal actions. Bear-
ing this in mind, Feather (1980), in a discussion of adolescent sex 
differences in values, noted that females are socialized to place more 
emphasis on "communal" values and concerns which favor allocentric 
behaviors whereas men are more likely to adopt values which sustain 
independence and competitive strivings. Likewise, Stein (1972) found 
female adolescents more oriented toward caring for others and helping 
those in need. 
The present findings also support Gilligan's (1978, 1982) asser-
tions that females are more inclined to value caring behaviors, 
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interpersonal concerns, and intimacy. The distinctive prosocial focus 
of the morality measure utilized in this study blends nicely with the 
"other voice" of women which esteems "care for and sensitivity to the 
needs of others" (1978, p. 55). 
Indirect support is also given to Hoffman's theory of empathic 
development. According to Hoffman's conceptualization, empathy is the 
integral component which orients humans to behave altruistically. 
Therefore, since the present research substantiates the view that fe-
males both obtain a higher level of empathic development than males 
and are more moral, it is possible to assume that empathy is a mediat-
ing experience which explains the higher female inclination to behave 
prosocially. 
All in all, the evidence that argues for females' greater 
tendency to favor prosocial acts is not incontrovertible. On the other 
hand, the present findings along with the research cited above set 
forth a strong argument to support the conclusion that there does exist 
a female disposition to behave in ways which benefit others in need 
which is clearly greater than male tendencies to adopt similar behaviors. 
The morality measures for the current study specifically probe responses 
which reflect 11 everyday11 life activities. Consequently, it might be 
that in ordinary life events, particularly in the context of adolescent 
development, the female's proclivity to be attentive to others interacts 
with her newly experienced intimacy need as well as the encouraging 
expectations of societal socialization forces to fashion a moral stance 
that is distinctly prosocial and separate from her male counterpart. 
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Relationship of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy 
It was hypothesized that there exists a positive relationship 
between social morality and liberalism. In line with this hypothesis, 
a highly significant positive relationship was found between a liberal 
political orientation and social morality (r = .45, E< .001). In addi-
tion to this finding, numerous other highly significant relationships 
were obtained. Table 3 lists the correlations on the combined male-
female population (N = 181). 
Highly significant relationships were discovered between morality 
and liberalism (.43, E< .001) and liberalism and the remaining two sub-
scales of morality (private= .27, ~< .001; interpersonal= .33, £< 
.001). Other highly significant relationships were found between em-
pathy and liberalism (.32, ~< .001) as well as empathy and morality 
( •. 42, ~< • 001) • Finally, the individual subscales of morality cor-
related highly with several empathy subscales. Private morality was 
found to be significantly related to fantasy (.18, ~< .01), perspective-
taking (. 34, ~< • 001) , and concern (. 3 7, .E_< • 001) • Interpersonal 
morality was significantly related to fantasy (.16, ~< .05), perspective-
taking (.49, .E.< .001), and concern (.36, ~< .001). Social morality was 
significantly related to perspective-taking (.29, ~< .001) and concern 
(.28, ~< .001). Unlike the relationship of private and interpersonal 
morality to distress, a highly significant relationship was found be-
tween social morality and distress (.22, ~< .001). Finally, the total 
empathy score was highly significantly correlated (.E_< .001) with all 
morality scores and the liberalism score. The total morality score was 
" 
Table 3 
lntercorrelations Among Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Combined Male-Female Adolescents 
1 
1. Morality (Private) 
-
2. Morality (Interpersonal) 
3. Morality (Social) 
4. Morality (Total) 
5. Liberalism 
6. Empathy (Fantasy) 
7. Empathy (Perspective-taking) 
8. Empathy (Concern) 
9. Empathy (Distress) 
10. Empathy (Total) 
p< .05 
p< .01 
p< .001 
2 3 4 
.61*** .63*** .88*** 
- .44*** .79*** 
- .85*** 
-
5 6 7 8 
.27*** .18** .34*** ~37*** 
.33*** .16* .45*** .36*** 
.45*** .10 .29*** .28*** 
.43*** .17* .42*** .40*** 
- .22** .18** .30*** 
- .26*** .28** 
-
.31*** 
-
9 10 
.03 .34*** 
-.01 .36*** 
.22*** .35*** 
.12 .42*** 
.14* .32*** 
.22* .71*** 
-.02 .62*** 
.21** .64*** 
-
.58*** 
Note: Empathy is defined as a focus on the other person which contains for the empathizer any one or combinations 
of imaginative, cognitive, affective, or distress components. 
Liberalism is defined as a political philosophy which stresses rights, equalities and social justice themes. 
Morality is defined as the endorsement of prosocial behaviors which impact on private, interpersonal, and 
social concerns. 
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highly significantly correlated with liberalism (.43, ~< .001) and 
most empathy measures (fantasy= .17, ~< .05; perspective-taking= .42, 
~< .001; concern= .40, ~< .001). 
Because the data resulted in a large number of statistically sig-
nificant correlations, a multiple regression analysis was performed on 
the combined male-female sample as well as on each sex separately in 
order to ascertain which variables are most apt to predict prosocial 
moral orientation. 
The dependent variable was the total morality score on the 
Visions of Morality Scale (a sum of private, interpersonal, and social 
subscale scores). The independent variables evaluated for the predic-
tive strength were: sex, liberalism, and the four empathy dimensions 
(fantasy, perspective-taking, concern, and distress). 
Four of the six variables were found to be significant predictors 
of morality. The beta weights for the predictor variables were as fol-
lows: liberalism= .245 (~< .001); perspective-taking= .266, (~< .001); 
sex= .224 (~< .001); and concern= .185 (~< .01). The mu~tiple R for 
these four predictor variables was .615 (significant at the .0001 
level) which accounted for approximately 37.8 percent of the variance 
in the total morality score. The predictive value of the variables is 
fairly uniform across all variables. 
Because morality is a highly complex construct, the obtained mul-
tiple R suggests that political orientation and empathy are valuable 
dimensions for understanding the development of an everyday morality. 
These findings provide significant support for theorists who maintain 
that moral decisions to respond prosocially are highly complex activities. 
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At the same time, analyses of prosocial responding must also take into 
consideration the possibility of sex differences. 
At the same time, delineating a group of predictor variables 
enhances the attempts of educational theorists and religious educators 
who argue for the acquisition of distinctive set of prosocial behaviors 
as requisite for the proper educational maturation of primary and se-
condary school youth. Essentially, these findings suggest. that a pro-
social orientation includes: an affective and cognitive component, an 
appreciation of sex role differences, and an internalization of social-
ly compassionate and humanitarian themes. 
The Relationship of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Males 
Table 4 summarizes the relationships of morality, liberalism, 
and empathy for male adolescents. For male adolescents, private moral-
ity was significantly related to perspective-taking (.32, £< .01) and 
concern (.37, £< .001). Interpersonal morality was significantly re-
lated to perspective-taking (.35, £< .001) and concern (.27, £< .01). 
A significant negative relationship was also reported between inter-
personal morality and distress (-.26, £< .05). Social morality was 
significantly related to liberalism (.20, £< .05), perspective-taking 
(.28, £< .01), and concern (.36, £< .001). Liberalism was also related 
to concern (.28, £< .01). 
The total morality score was significantly correlated with per-
spective-taking (.38, £< .001) and concern (.41, £< .001). The total 
empathy score was related to all other measures except interpersonal 
morality. These relationships included: private morality (.3i, £< .01), 
Table 4 
lntercorrelations ~ng Empathy, Liberalism, and Morality for Hale Adolescents 
1 
1. Morality (Private) -
2. Morality (Interpersonal) 
3. Morality (Social) 
4. Morality (Total) 
5. Liberalism 
6. Empathy (Fantasy) 
7. Empathy (Perspective-taking) 
8. Empathy (Concern) 
9. Empathy (Distress) 
10. Empathy (Total) 
* p< .05 
** p< .01 
••• p< .001 
2 3 4 
.59*** .62*** .89*** 
-
.40*** .76*** 
-
.84*** 
-
5 6 7 8 
.09 .12 .32** .37*** 
.16 .18 .35*** .27** 
.20* .07 .28** .36*** 
.18 .09 .38*** .41*** 
.28** .00 .28** 
.23* .00 
.24* 
9 10 
-.08 .31** 
-.26** .17 
.18 .38*** 
-.03 .46*** 
.13 .29** 
.05 .59*** 
-.08 .66*** 
.09 .53*** 
.46*** 
0\ 
...... 
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social morality (. 38, .E_< • 001) , liberalism (. 29, .E_< • 01) and the total 
morality score (.37, .E_< .001). 
A multiple regression analysis utilizing five variables (liberal-
ism and the four empathy dimensions) was performed on the total morality 
score for males. This analysis resulted in two empathy dimensions 
(concern and perspective-taking) as significant predictors for the total 
morality score. The beta weights for these two predictor variables 
were found to be, respectively, concern = .325, (.E_< .01) and perspective-
taking .284 (.E_< .01). The Multiple R was .476 (.E_< .0001) which was 
found to account for approximately 22.7 percent of the variance in the 
total morality score for males. 
The Relationships of Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Females-
Overall, males showed fewer significant relationships than females. 
Table 5 summarizes the results for females. Highly signifcant results 
were obtained by female adolescents on the various measures. Private 
morality was significantly related to liberalism (.26, .E_< .01); and ·awo 
measures of empathy (perspective-taking, .28, .E_< .01; concern, .28, .E_< 
.01). Interpersonal morality was significantly related to liberalist&i 
(.30, .E_< .01) and most empathy measures (fantasy= .18, .E_< .01); per-. 
spective-taking = .47, .E_< .001; concern= .35, .E_< .001). The fewest~n 
significant relationships were obtained with social morality. This sub-
scale correlated with liberalism (.49, .E_< .001) and perspective-taking 
(.21, .E_< .05). 
Significant relationships were also discovered between the total 
morality score and several measures. Morality was related to liberalism 
Table 5 
lntercorrelations Among Morality, Liberalism, and Empathy for Female Adolescents 
1 2. 3 4 5 6 
1. Morality (Private) - .55** .55*** .85*** .27** .16 
2. Morality (Interpersonal - .33*** .75*** .30*** .18** 
3. Morality (Social) - .81*** .49*** .05 
4. Morality (Total) - .46*** .14 
5. Liberalism - .12 
6. Empathy (Fantasy) 
-
7. Empathy (Perspective) 
8. Empathy (Concern) 
9. Empathy (Distress) 
10. Empathy (Total 
"' p<.05 
** p<.Ol 
*** p<.OOl 
7 8 
.28** .28** 
.47*** .35*** 
.21* .10 
.38*** .28** 
.23** .20* 
.26** .47*** 
- .31*** 
-
9 
-.07 
-.04 
.08 
-.01 
-.03 
.28** 
-.10 
.20* 
-
10 
.24** 
.35*** 
.17* 
.29** 
.19* 
.80*** 
.56*** 
.70*** 
.56*** 
0\ 
w 
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(. 46, _£< • 001) , perspective-taking (. 38, _£< • 001) and concern (. 28, .E. 
< • 01) • 
The total empathy score was related to all other measures includ-
ing private morality (.24, _£< .01), interperso~al morality (.35, _£< 
• 001) ' social morality ( .17' .E_< • 01) ' liberalism ( .19, .£_< • 01) and the 
total morality score (.29, _£< .01). 
Similar to the analyses carried out above, a multiple regression 
analysis was performed on the total morality score utilizing five pre-
dictor variables (liberalism and the four empathy dimensions). Contrary 
to the findings for males, significant beta weights for predictor vari-
able for females were found to be liberalism (.386, _£< .001) and per-
spective-taking (.291, _£< .001). The Multiple R for these two variables 
was .534 (.£< .0001) which accounted for approximately 28.5 percent of 
the variance in the total morality score. 
One of the most striking findings in the present study is the 
different ways in which female and male adolescents related moral vi-
sions to liberalism. Overall, morality is highly significantly related 
to liberalism for females but not for males. Extremely high-significance 
levels were found among females for all visions of morality with li-
beralism. In contrast to this finding, only social morality was sig-. 
nificantly related to liberalism for male adolescents. Consequently, a 
large number of male adolescents who view themselves as moral tend to 
endorse conservative political attitudes. Two possible interpretations 
exist for this finding. For one, it suggests that the relationship of 
morality to· politics for males is more complex than for females inasmuch 
65 
as highly conservative males often classify themselves as moral. 
Eisenberg-Berg (1977) has noted that socialization to prosocial behav-
iors is commonly experienced during childhood. Prosocial behaviors are 
consonant with conventional standards of morality and thus appealing to 
both conservatives and liberal male adolescents. However, since liberal 
political ideals are interspersed with numerous prosocial and humani-
tarian themes, it is plausible that liberal females, who are already 
inclined more than their male counterparts to behave prosocially, will 
heavily endorse prosocial themes. On the other hand, females who reject 
the prosocial themes threaded throughout the liberalism scale, might 
well be adolescents whose behavioral tendencies are decidedly less pro-
soc1al. Their resistance to liberalism's prosocial tendencies might 
result from their disinclination towards prosocially acceptable be-
haviors. In other words, the conservative female and conservative male 
might well represent two distinctively different moral persuasions. 
For males, then, favoring of prosocial behaviors by the conservative 
leads to a variety of political persuasions which can claim the title 
of moral whereas for the female the disinclination to endorse prosocial 
responses by the conservatives leads to a unidimensional focus which 
designates the liberal female as the moral individual. 
A second plausible explanation for these findings is that males 
are consistent in their responses. That is, male conservatives re-
spond inconsistently to the Visions of Morality Scale and erroneously 
endorse a higher level of morality. Research studies examining the 
prosocial tendencies of secondary school adolescents (Eisenberg-Berg, 
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& Musse~, 1980; Mussen, 1982) have consistently found that liberals 
are more inclined to be prosocial than their conservative counterparts. 
Unfortunately, these studies did not examine the influence of sex on 
partisan political persuasions; thus, it is not possible to explore 
discrete differences between male and female conservatives. 
Moreover, Mussen (1982) found that conservative adolescents 
tended to describe themselves as more inclined to worry about making 
mistakes or doing something bad; likewise, they were less inclined than 
their liberal peers to engage in self-criticism. Given the male ten-
dency to maintain independence and status (Staub, 1978), it might be 
that the needs of male adolescents might combine with the conservative 
tendency to disallow critical self-evaluation and lead male conservatives 
to be inconsistent in their moral responses. Further research of con-
servative male and female adolescents is needed in order to examine 
which of these explanations is accurate. 
At the same time, it is important to note that for both sexes 
social morality is significantly related to liberalism. Thus education-
al institutions which desire to insure a prosocial stance by their 
students on social issues need to consider the value preferences and 
attitudinal endorsements which characterize the liberal political per-
suasion. 
Moreover, the highly significant relationship between morality 
and liberalism supports Mussen's (1982) assertion that liberals are 
more disposed to altruistic motivations than their conservative counter-
parts. However, what still needs to be addressed is the issue of 
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whether salient characteristics differentiate.highly moral conserva-
tives from highly moral liberals. Conversely, the differences between 
highly moral liberals and conservatives and their counterparts who are 
decidedly less prosocial in orientation need to be examined. 
Of all the empathy measures, distress is clearly the least likely 
empathic experience to be associated with a prosocial response. For 
the combined male-female populations, distress is not significantly 
related to either private or interpersonal morality, but is highly 
significantly related to social morality. Lifton (1979) has remarked 
that the human person encounters "anxiety when one feels helpless in 
the face of the threat despite the impulse to counter it" (p. 129). He 
concludes that the psychic numbing arising from the foreboding helpless-
ness engendered by the threat of nuclear annihilation leads to stasis, 
psychopathological states, and death. However, the current study would 
challenge such thinking and argue that a level of psychic distress (in-
cluding overwhelming emotional states and a feeling of helplessness) is 
strongly related to prosocial acts which have a distinctly social dimen-
sion. In a recent article Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak (1983), demon-
strare that actions to oppose nuclear arms are significantly related to 
the concreteness of an individual's nuclear image. Blending these two 
line~ of thinking, an optimum strategy for fostering socially just be-
haviors might be a focus on concrete images with a parallel focus on 
aspects of affective responses which mirror an incapacity to respond 
effectively to distress and the plight of others (e.g., helplessness 
felt when thinking of the magnitude of poverty in one's country). 
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The inclinations to respond prosocially to social concerns ap-
pears to contradict assertions that affective overarousal inhibits 
prosocial actions. It might be that Hoffman's theory of overarousal 
applies more to interpersonal situations whereas more socially oriented 
concerns are influenced by a different dynamic. Thus an individual 
when exposed to a distress-filled interpersonal situation might fail 
to respond to another's plight. On the other hand, the overwhelming 
distress one feels when reflecting on images of nuclear extinction or 
world hunger might lead one to constructively channel energies into 
efforts to eradicate such threats and disasters. 
Another striking finding of the present research is the centrality 
of cognitive and affective variables in defining the nature of empathy. 
The regression analysis found that prosocial responding was consistently 
related to the presence of perspective-taking on the combined male-
female sample and on the separate male and female samples. Equally im-
portant, however, is the absence of fantasy and distress as predictor 
variables for prosocial responding. Although Davis' (1980) argument 
for a four-dimensional approach to empathy might well be valid for a 
definitional understanding of the term, it appears, at least in terms 
of a moral orientation, that the cognitive and affective features are 
the essential components for a prosocial response. These findings lend 
strong support to Hoffman's theory of altruistic motivation which views 
the affective arousal to another's plight, engendered in part by an 
awareness of the other's suffering, as an inducement for motivating an 
altruistic response. Moreover, Hoffman's prediction that affective 
overarousal (distress) attenuates altruistic responding is strongly 
confirmed by the present research; that is, all three regression 
analyses failed to find distress to be a predictive variable for pro-
social responding. 
The presence of liberalism as a predictive variable corroborates 
the research of Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1980) which maintains that 
a liberal political orientation is associated with an altruistic 
tendencies. Apparently, a liberal political persuasion is capable of 
eliciting an underlying altruistic response. Accordingly, commonly held 
liberal values, such as equality and justice, or the focus on the needs 
of the impoverished might well activate this prosocial tendency among 
liberals. 
At the same time, the present findings point to the need to dis-
criminate between the sources of the prosocial response for males and 
females. For males, concern and perspective-taking emerge as predictor 
variables whereas, for females, liberalism and perspective-taking are 
the predictors. This suggests, as noted in the correlational analysis 
discussed above, that one plausible interpretation is that a male moral 
orientation is capable of encompassing a wider spectrum of political 
persuasions whereas the female moral orientation is more closely linked 
with liberalism. Accordingly, it appears that the conservative male is 
more likely to embrace a higher moral stance; in contrast, the female 
conservative is more apt to endorse a moral orientation which is distinct-
ly non-pro social. As noted, however, more research is needed to ascel'.tain 
whether this is indeed the case or if males are simply responding incon-
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sistently. Thus it might be that these findings have significant 
ramifications for educational programs which attempt to instill a sense 
of social compassion in secondary school youth. For males, techniques 
and strategies might need to emphasize both affective education which 
stimulates awareness and sensitivity to personal feelings and role-
taking experiences .which allow the male adolescent to be cognizant of 
the needs and hurts of suffering individuals. On the other hand, stra-
tegies and techniques which attempt to encourage a social sensitivity 
for female adolescents need to link the humanitarian and social themes 
common to liberal thinking with role taking experiences. 
Intercorrelations Among Subscales 
On the combined male-female sample as well as on the separate 
samples, high intercorrelations were obtained for the various subscales. 
On all three samples the morality subscales correlated at the .001 
level. This high level of significance was also held true for the re-
lationship between the total morality score and each of the subscales 
on all three samples. 
The total empathy score, likewise, correlated at the .001 level 
with each of the empathy subscales. On the other hand, differences 
were noted among the various subscales. For example, on the combined 
male-female sample, fantasy was significantly related to perspective-
taking (.26, £< .001), concern (.28, £< .001), and distress (.22, £< 
.01). Perspective-taking was significantly correlated with concern 
(.31, £< .001). Concern was significantly correlated with distress 
(.21, £< .01). 
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Subscale scores on empathy for the separate female and male 
populations lacked uniformity. For females, fantasy significantly 
correlated with perspective-taking (.26, ~< .01), concern (.47, ~< .001), 
and distress (.28, ~< .01). Perspective-taking was significantly re-
lated to concern (.31, ~< .001) but without statistical significance 
when related to distress (-.10). Concern was significantly related to 
distress (.20, ~< .OS). 
Males reported fewer significant relationships among the empathy 
subscales. Thus fantasy was related to perspective-taking (.23, ~< .01) 
but lacked statistical significance when related to concern (.00) or 
distress (.OS). Perspective-taking was significantly related to con-
cern (.24, ~< .OS) but without statistical significance when related 
to distress (-.08). 
The Visions of Morality Scale 
An added dimension of the present study is the possibility of 
developing for psychological research the first prosocial morality 
measure~ 
In addition to the excellent findings regarding score distribu-
tions, the criterion of internal consistency was maintained by the 
high correlation of subscale scores with the total score. In other 
words, the correlations of the individual morality scores with the 
total morality score were as follows: private = .88; interpersonal = 
.79; social= .8S. Similar high correlations were found for both the 
separate male and female samples. 
In addition, consistency was found among all three samples on 
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some scores. All three samples (combined male-female, male, female) 
obtained their highest mean on the interpersonal score. This finding 
is expected inasmuch as interpersonal morality is defined as prosocial 
behavior which benefits someone the agent knows. Characteristically, 
individuals are most apt to behave favorably towards those individuals 
who are friends or personal acquaintances. Conversely, the greatest 
variance in scores occurs with the social morality subscore. This 
type of morality is the most complicated in terms of issues and most 
potentially divisive as the result of political and social ideologies 
which can be interjected as a rationale for deciding what is an ap-
propriate behavior. As expected, both males and females showed the 
lowest inclination to endorse this morality. 
Furthermore, three findings support the construct validity of 
this measure. First, interpersonal morality correlates most strongly 
(.45) with perspective-taking. This is a persuasive finding because 
awareness of another is necessary for any type of appropriate behavior 
to occur. Second, social morality correlates more strongly than 
either of the other two subscales with liberalism. This is expected 
because of the related content covered by these two measures. Finally, 
the fewest significant relationships found between the morality subscale 
measures and the empathy measures is distress. This finding is sup-
ported by Hoffman's assertion that empathic overarousal inhibits pro-
social responding. 
The Visions of Morality Scale measure also provides :the opportunity 
to develop similar measures for other populations (e.g., college-age 
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adolescents, adults). In addition, this measure affords numerous re-
search opportunities. Studies can be undertaken, for example, to as-
certain the relationship of everyday morality to moral reasoning, ego 
development, and personality characteristics (e.g., intimacy and 
achievement motivations). 
Towards an Everyday Morality 
In terms of the development of moral theory, the most interesting 
finding of the present research is the relationship between everyday 
morality and empathy. These results need to be interpreted cautiously 
due to the nature of self-report measures and correlational findings. 
Consequently, the use of self-report measures rather than a behavioral 
criterion mitigates the inferences which can be ascertained from the 
data. Furthermore, given that the findings are correlational, the 
strong relationship found between morality and empathy must be cautious-
ly interpreted. 
Still, the highly significant relationships reported between 
empathy and morality give added weight to other theoretical speculations 
that have considered empathy to be a fundamental component for morality 
(e.g., Hogan, 1973; Hoffman, 1980). In addition, Hoffman's assertion 
that empathy is the core experience required for initiating altruistic 
behavior finds confirmatory support in the present findings which esta-
blish a strong relationship between empathy and prosocial responding. 
Shelton (in press) has argued that empathy is the human foundation 
for ethical behavior. If this is true, then the development of empathic 
tendencies provides the concrete experiencing that is requisite for the 
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implementation of ethical and religious ideals. In other words, pro-
grams and strategies to implement ethical behaviors must take into 
consideration the experience of empathy. Likewise, if strategies and 
programs which foster prosocial behaviors (Staub, 1981) can be tied 
to empathy, then the effectiveness of such programs might be enhanced. 
The implications of an empathically based morality are immense. 
Moral educators have long sought human dispositions which encourage 
the ethical and religious ideals of their adherents. An empathically 
based morality which focuses on everyday life behaviors fulfills this 
search. 
Furthermore, an empathically based morality affords a viable al-
ternative to previous attempts at moral theorizing (e.g., Kohlberg). 
An empathically based morality resonates with the common, everyday life 
experiences of human beings as moral agents. Individuals who embrace 
diverse moral and ideological values can easily relate to behaviors 
commonly experienced by others. Thus an empathically based morality 
provides a common basis for dialogue among individuals who otherwise 
might encounter difficulty in understanding one another's needs and con-
cerns. 
At the same time, further research is needed to determine charac-
teristics which might differentiate high and low scoring individuals 
on the Visions of Morality Scale. Also, research is neaded to ascer-
tain whether individuals who are similar in their moral orientations 
yet hold diverse religious, philosophical, or political beliefs manifest 
different characteristics (e.g., moral reasoning, personal values). 
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SUBJECT QUESTIONNAIRE INCORPORATING VISIONS OF MORALITY SCALE, 
LIBERALISM SCALE, AND· INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
Listed below are some situations. Please answer these statements ac-
cording to the criteria described below. Note there are NO rigqt or 
wrong answers. You are simply asked to mark on the answer sheet which 
answer indicates what YOU would currently do if you were in the situa-
tion descirbed. Please mark only one answer for each statement. 
Please answer ALL statements. 
A= When I choose this statement I am saying I would DEFINITELY do what 
the statement says I do. 
B= When I choose this statement I am saying I would PROBABLY do what 
the statement says I do. 
C= When I choose this statement I am saying I MIGHT do what the state-
ment says I do. I am more likely to do than not to do. 
D= When I choose this statement I am saying I am not sure whether I 
would do or would not do what the statement says I do. I am clearly 
UNSURE as to what I would do. 
E= When I choose this statement I am saying I MIGHT NOT do what the 
statement says I do. I am more likely not to do than to do. 
F= When I choose this statement I am saying I PROBABLY WOULD NOT do 
what the statement says I do. 
G= When I choose this statement I am saying I DEFINITELY WOULD NOT do 
what the statement says I do. 
1. A local community group has come to my school and requests students 
to volunteer to take part in a hunger march. For every mile that 
is walked a local merchant will contribute one dollar. I agree to 
take part and I walk five miles. -
2. I am walking alone and I find 
and continue walking. I pass 
money for muscular dystrophy. 
the basket. 
a dollar on the street. I pick it up 
a group of people who are collecting 
! drop the dollar that I found into 
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3. I am a member of the history club at the school which consists of 
fifteen members. The club invites to the school a guest speaker 
who will speak on current political events. A three person committ-
ee needs some members to come two hours early on the night of the 
speech in order to set up chairs and fix refreshments. I am asked 
by a member of the committee to come two hours early. ! tell the 
person that I will come to the talk but I will not come two hours 
early to set up. 
4. I overhear two freshmen talking and saying that no one every goes 
to their games to watch them play, even when they play at home. 
I realize I have a free afternoon after school this next Thursday 
when the freshmen play at home. ! show up for their game after 
school on Thursday and I say at least half the game. 
5. I read in a psychology magazine how people who smile actually help 
other people to feel better about themselves. The next day when I 
go to work as a checker at the local grocery store ! intentionally 
make the point to smile at each customer who comes to my checkout 
stand. 
6. It is a snowy day and I am off from school. I decide to walk around 
the block to get some fresh air. As I begin walking I notice a 
driver and his car are stuck in snow. ! keep on walking and do not 
stop to help. 
7. I have tickets to a local rock concert with some friends (classmates). 
The concern is sold out. One of my friends who is going with me 
has to back out because he forgot that he/she has to help his/her 
family this weekend. Although I have several friends in school who 
would like to buy the ticket, I offer it to a new transfer student 
in hopes that this will give him/her a chance to meet some people. 
8. In our town there is a referndum to raise local taxes 3%. Support-
er~ of this tax measure say it is uecessary in order to continue 
providing necessary social welfare services for the needy. Oppon-
ents of the measure say that taxes are high enough already and that 
people are paying all that they should in taxes. On election day 
! voite against the 3% tax increase. 
9. I work in a movie theater as an usher with several people my own 
age. The head of the theater is making out the schedule for the 
Christmas holidays. I know that one of the ushers wants to go with 
his family to visit his grandmother for Christmas but he has been 
put down to work Christmas Day whereas I am off that day. I go to 
the usher and tell him to switch me with this other usher which, in 
effect, makes me work Christmas Day and allows the other usher to 
gat off. I tell the manager not to tell the other usher I did this. 
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10. A fellow student that I know casually asks if I have an.hour this 
Saturday to help him/her with some math problems (I am very good at 
math). I.am .free on Saturday so I tell the student that I would be 
happy to help him/her. 
11. When cleaning up my room I collect several pieces of clothing that 
I no longer use. I can dispose of them or drive five miles to the 
Salvation Army and drop them in their drop-off box. ! dispose of 
them and do not drive the five miles. 
12. I am asked to write in class an essay on why I want to go into a 
particular career and what influences me to choose this career. 
When I write my essay I say that the most important influence on 
any career I choose is the desire to help people. 
13. My entire class is going on a weekend outing to the amusement park. 
One of my classmates who I know casually loses his/her money at the 
park. Several students chip in and give the student $5 each. I am 
one of the students who gives this person five dollars. 
14. A classmate from my homeroom who I know casually has been in an 
accident and there is an .announcement that students can give blood 
if they wish. I am in good health and can give blood and not afraid 
of needles or blood. I do not volunteer. 
15. A report is published in the paper which rates how local companies 
have attempted to help alleviate miniority unemployment. These 
ratings are not a factor when I decide which stores I will shop in. 
lb. Several friends of mine are going to a movie this weekend which has 
gotten good reviews. The movie has also been depicted by several 
reviewers "as unfortunately supporting and reinforcing sexist and 
violent attitudes." ! go to the film. 
17. I win $50 in the state lottery. I find this out in the morning and 
in· the afternoon a. volunteer for the annual cerebal palsey drive 
stops by and requests that I make a contribution if I can afford 
it. I do not make a contribution. 
18. I have a personality clash and simply do not get along with one of 
my teachers. I hear from a family friend that this teacher's 
father has been quite sick recently. Over the next few.weeks I 
make a conscious effort to be respectful in class and I go out of 
my way to say "hello" to him when I pass him in the halls. 
19. A neighbor on my block asks me to take her shopping twice a week while 
her husband is recuperating from a hear attack. She does not drive. 
She asks me and ! agree to take her twice a week for the next t~ree 
weeks. 
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20. I read in the paper about a family who has lost all their belong-
ings in a fire. I anonymously send a ten dollar check to a fund 
set up for the family by the town newspaper. 
21. I am walking downtown fairly rapidly with a friend so that we can 
make a movie on time. As I am walking I notice a person standing 
by a car next to a parking meter. He is holding some change in his 
hands and looks frustrated. I interrupt my walk to the movies and 
go over to ask him if he needs correct change for the parking meter. 
I exchange currency with him so that he will have correct change. 
24 ·Alocal civic group has requested over the radio that volunteers are 
needed to sign up to help prepare and serve a free meal on Christmas 
Day for the needy. f sign up and work four hours on Christmas Day. 
23. I receive a visit from a member of a fraternity/sorority located at 
the college that I plan to attend in the fall.. After a discussion 
about the fraternity/sorority's lifestyle and procedures, I bring 
up the question about racial feelings in the organization and in-
quire about feelings toward minorities. I state that I would not 
be interested in a group that is not open-to having minority members. 
24. In the upcoming primary election there are several candidates who 
have distributed various pieces of literature on issues such as 
world hunger, peace, military spending, and aid to certain foreign 
governments. In evaluating the candidates and deciding who to vote 
for, I use the above issue position as the primary determining factor 
for my vote. 
25. I read an article in a popular magazine uring readers to write letters 
to foreign governments who are keeping political prisoners to protest 
their imprisonment (e.g., Central America, Communist countries). I 
do not write any letters. 
26. I hear on a local radio station that the city orphanage is have a 
paper drive and is requesting residents to bring in their papers. 
The proceeds received from the paper drive will be used to buy re-
creation equipment at the orphanage. I have the afternoon off so I 
gather my papers at home and drive the-five miles to the orphanage 
to drop them off. 
27. An eighth grade classmate who I have not seen in several years calls 
me up and requests my help for a 5 year 8th grade reunion that is 
being planned by this former classmate along with two others from the 
class. The classmate asks me if I could spare several hours contact-
ing people at my high school and also help to set up for the party. 
I tell the classmate I'll probably come to the reunion but I say I 
will not be able to help with the details. 
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28. I am reading the paper one morning and I come across an article 
entitled: "How to Become a Better Citizen." Since it is an elec-
tion year I memorize the main points and use them as criteria for 
evaluating-candidates who are running for office. 
29. In order to make people aware of world hunger, students at my school 
are requested to restrict their food intake.at lunch during the 
month of March and donate the money they save to a world hunger drive. 
I take the pledge to be part of this drive and donate my lunch money 
during the month of March to this drive. 
30. I am involved in a heated argument with a classmate about a histor-
ical date. I read a few days later in a library book that my class-
mate is right. I apologize to my classmate for the argument and 
admit to the classmate that he/she is right. 
31. It is the end of the semester and everyone seems tired and looking 
forward to the upcoming vacation. A few of my classmates seem 
particularly tired of school and start to complain quite regularly 
about school. I make an effort not to.complain and say· to them 
when they do complain that things aren't that bad and point out the 
good things that are going on in the school. 
32. A local restaurant has discriminated against a racial minority. I 
am out one night with a group of friends. We are all hungry and my 
three friends in the car voice a desire to eat at this restaurant. 
I speak up and say ! do not want to eat at this restaurant because 
of its discriminatory policies. 
33. There is a blood drive at school. I am in good health, can give 
blood and not afraid of the sight of blood or needles. I do not 
volunteer to give a pint of blood. 
34. As I walk down the street, I notice a blind lady is walking down the 
other side of the street with a cane and appears confused. I cross 
the street and ask her if she needs assistance. When I discover her 
problem, I walk her the two blocks to the store that she wishes to 
go to. 
35. While riding to school with several classmates there is a discussion 
about some violent crimes reported in the newspaper the night before. 
Several of my classmates say that "tougher laws are needed" and that 
"criminals are getting away with too much." I respond that crimin-
als must be punished but the real problem, for the most part, are the 
inhuman social conditions such as poverty and unemployment that en-
courage crime and I plan to work to help alleviate these conditions. 
36. I am able to get a part time job after school. My new employer 
tells me that he can use one other person on a part time basis. 
I know that several of my friends would like to have this job. 
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I also know that a student who I know casually belongs to a family 
that is experiencing some difficult financial problems and would 
like to have the job too. I mention to one of my friends who I 
would enjoy working with that there is a job opening. 
37. I work part time as a checker at the local grocery store in my 
neighborhood. When I receive my next paycheck I also receive a 
request in my pay envelope to contribute to a· local charitable 
organization. ! do not check the box on the request form which 
~ays I will contribute ten dollars of my next paycheck to the fund. 
38. I read where a large company's policies overseas have victimized 
the lower class of the country. This company makes one of my 
favorite snack foods. As a means of protest, ! give up eating this 
snack. 
39. The administrator of the schools asks all upper class students 
(juniors and seniors) to give some serious thought to ways to im-
prove the school for future students. Each junior and senior is 
requested to spend some time seriously reflecting on their years at 
the school and then to fill out a questionnaire (anonymously) and to 
send the form to the school. I take this request seriously and over 
the next few weeks think of ways to improve the school. I fill out 
the form and send it in. 
40. I am going to drive this weekend with two friends to a university I 
hope to attend when I graduate from high school. The school is 
roughly 100 miles away. We are leaving on Friday afternoon after 
school and returning late Sunday evening. Another student who I 
don't know too well asks me if he can come along (I am driving my 
car). He wants to be dropped off at another school which is on the 
way. We would have to detour 20 miles off the main highway, however. 
He/she says "just drop me off on the way and pick me up Sunday 
evening on the way back." This student volunteers to chip in some 
gas money. ! agree to take the student along. 
41 •. I am walking home and I pass a woman who I barely know (she lives 
at the other end of the block from me). She is carrying with some 
difficulty a large and medium bag of groceries. ! continue walking 
towards my home. 
42. The school I attend needs volunteers who will come two hours early 
on an evening next week to be greeters and parking attendants for 
the annual freshman parents' night. I volunteer and come two hours 
early. 
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43. In order to conserve energy and adopt a similar lifestyle, I limit 
myself to only necessary driving. Thus, in good weather, ! walk 
the five blocks to the local shopping center when I need something. 
44. A local resident of our township has been critically injured in an 
accident. A woman calls our home asking my family to volunteer some 
time to either make posters for a booth or sit at a booth in the 
local shopping center this Saturday collecting money to help pay for 
the hugh hospital costs. My family agrees to help, ! do not volunteer 
45. In order to make better use of natural resources, I have our family 
save cans. I take responsibility for this aluminum can saving and 
I donate the money (a few dollars a month) to a needy charitable 
cause. 
For statements 45-77 you are asked to respond to the extent that you 
agree or disagree with the statement. Please read each statement very 
carefully and decide how you feel about it. Then mark one of the answers 
for each statement. Please make only one mark for each statement. 
Please answer ALL statements. Please note there are NO right or wrong 
answers. 
A = I very strongly agree with this statement. 
B = I strongly agree with this statement. 
C = I agree with this stateruen~. 
D = I agree with this statement more than disagree with it. 
E = I disagree with this statement more than agree with it. 
F = I disagree with this statement. 
G = I strongly disagree with this statement. 
H = I very strongly disagree with this statement. 
46. Our government is elected by the majority of the people, so there is 
no excuse for protesting against it. 
47. No matter what they think, teachers should not speak against our 
government in their classrooms. 
48. The government should take over some businesses in this country and 
run them to benefit everyone. 
49. Anyone who works hard can succeed in the U.S. 
50. It is alright to protest against the government by going on peace-
ful marches. 
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51. Wealthy people should pay a lot more taxes to the government than 
poorer people. 
52. There is so much poverty in this country because poor people are too 
lazy to work hard. 
53. Labor unions are a bad thing because they cause too many strikes. 
54. Most criminals will never be able to live right no matter how much 
we do for them. 
55. Whether you are rich or poor, you can get the same good education 
in this country. 
56. America should spend less money on the military and more money 
helping poor people. 
5'7. The way to stop poverty is for the government to help poor people 
get a good job and more education. 
58. If a man murders somebody he deserves to be killed himself. 
59. The United States does not need to have the most powerful military 
forces in the world. 
60. Labor unions do a lot more good than harm. 
61. Communist countries like China and Russia are our enemies and we 
should treat them as enemies. 
62. Communists who disagree with the American system should be allowed 
to make speeches against our country. 
63. The way to prevent crime in this country is to find more jobs for 
people. 
64. The United States should stop world communism by force, if necessary. 
65. Crime is more often the fault of our society than the fault of the 
criminal. 
66. Even if newspapers say things against the government, they should be 
able to print whatever they want. 
67. People in minority groups have less chance of getting good jobs than 
white people even if they are qualified for the work. 
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68. Poor people and people in minority groups in this country get fair 
treatment from the police. 
69. The government is spending too much money on welfare. 
70. We need tougher laws against crime in this country. 
71. Poor people in this country should not have to take care of them-
selves without help. 
72. Big companies already pay their fair share of taxes and shouldn't 
have to pay more. 
73. If a man loses an election, he should speak up if he is against 
what the winner does. 
74. If a man can't get a job there is no reason for the government to 
help him. 
75. Judges and courts do not give fair and equal treatment to everyone 
in this country. 
76. Congressmen and Senators should have more say about what the Presi-
dent does because they are supposed to represent ideas of all the 
people. 
77. I would never protest against the government. 
Listed below are some statements (78-105). Please use the criteria 
listed below to answer these statements. Please mark only one answer 
for each statement. Please answer ALL questions. Again, there are NO 
right or wrong answers. 
A = This statement alwa:ls describes me. 
B = This statement frequently describes me. 
c = This statement sometimes describes me. 
D = This statement rarely describes me. 
E = This statement never describes me. 
78. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that 
might happen to me. 
79. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate 
than me. 
80. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" 
perspective. 
81. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are 
having problems. 
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82. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
83. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
84. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't 
often get completely caught up in it. 
85. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make 
a decision. 
86. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of pro-
tective towards them. 
87. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional 
situation. 
88. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how 
things look from their perspective. 
89. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat 
rar.e for me •. 
90. When I see someone get hurt I tend to ~emain calm. 
91. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
92. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time 
listening to other people's arguments. 
93. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of 
the characters. 
94. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
95. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel 
very much pity for them. 
96. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. 
97. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
98. I belive that there are two sides to every question and try to look 
at both of them. 
99. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
100. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the 
place of a leading character. 
101. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
102. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his 
shoes" for a while. 
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103. When I am reading an intersting story or novel, 1 ~gjne how I 
' •• < •.J. -
would feel if the events in the story were happening to me. 
104. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to 
pieces. 
105. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if 
I were in their place. 
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